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ABSTRACT
Much recent work in academic literature andpolicy discussions suggests
that the proliferation of actuarial-meaning statistical-assessments of a
defendant's recidivism risk in state sentencing structures is problematic. Yet
scholars and policymakers focus on changes in technology over time while
ignoring the effects of these tools on society. This Article shifts the focus
away from technology to society in order to reframe debates. It asserts that
sentencing technologies subtly change key social concepts that shape
punishment and society. These same conceptual transformations preserve
problematic features of the sociohistorical phenomenon of mass
incarceration. By connecting technological interventions and conceptual
transformations, this Article exposes an obscured threat posed by the
proliferation of risk tools as sentencing reform. As sentencing technologies
transform sentencing outcomes, the tools also alter society's language and
concerns about punishment. Thus, actuarial risk tools as technological
sentencing reform not only excise society 's deeper issues of race, class, and
power from debates. The tools also strip society of a language to resist the
status quo by changing notions ofjustice along the way.
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INTRODUCTION
Actuarial risk tools are statistical assessments designed to predict a
defendant's likelihood of engaging in recidivism in the future. The tools are
controversial, and much ink has been spilled on their use at sentencing. This
Article challenges a common justification for tool use advanced by
proponents: that actuarial risk assessments are nothing new to sentencing,
historically speaking. From the "golden era" of clinical rehabilitation in the
1960s, to the creation of parole guidelines in the 1970s, to the creation of
sentencing guidelines in the 1980s, policymakers have embedded actuarial
risk assessments in the technologies we create to shape punishment
outcomes. Proponents use this reality to justify the expansion of statistically
robust actuarial risk tools as sentencing reform today. The argument goes
like this: These tools are simply better at doing what humans already try to
do. What's more, advocates claim, the tools may be used for a beneficent
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purpose-to address unnecessary reliance on incarceration in a pragmatic
way. Since the tools have improved and can continue to improve technically,
why not use them?
This Article complicates that argument. Sentencing technologies do not
just do what humans do. They change how society understands what we do
by altering the meaning of social concepts that shape our human
interactions. I This Article examines how three social concepts-
rehabilitation, racial equality, and dangerousness-have altered through the
obsessive pursuit of technological advancement at sentencing. It connects
the conceptual changes with critical social transformations that sustain the
sociohistorical phenomenon of mass incarceration. This includes increased
castigatory government surveillance in marginalized communities,
resignation to racialized punishment practices, and legitimation of the
expanding net of the carceral state. By illuminating obscured
transformations, this Article provides foundation to reframe and expand
debates about technological sentencing reforms going forward.
Since the 1960s, states have incorporated risk assessments into the
punishment technologies meant to shape sentencing outcomes. Recently,
lawmakers, scholars, and policymakers have encouraged states to adopt
more statistically robust actuarial risk tools as sentencing reform.2 These
tools rely on data observing and aggregating offenders' behavior in the past
to predict an individual defendant's behavior in the future.3 From an
empirical standpoint, it is not clear that the tools reduce crime or
incarceration. # Indeed, there is every reason to believe that increasing
1. See generally BERNARD E. HARCOURT, AGAINST PREDICTION: PROFILING, POLICING, AND
PUNISHING IN AN ACTUARIAL AGE (2007) [hereinafter AGAINST PREDICTION]; BERNARD E. HARCOURT,
ILLUSION OF ORDER: THE FALSE PROMISE OF BROKEN WINDOWS POLICING (2001) [hereinafter
ILLUSION OF ORDER]; MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON (Alan
Sheridan trans., 1977).
2. See, e.g., Jared Kushner, The Trump Administration's Commitment to Justice Reform, in
ENDING MASS INCARCERATION: IDEAS FROM TODAY'S LEADERS 57, 57-59 (Inimai Chettiar & Priya
Raghavan eds., 2019), https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/publications/2019 EndingMas
slncarcerationdigital.pdf [https://perma.cc/4SD9-2HUV] (endorsing the use of risk assessments and
"evidence-based" interventions in criminal justice reform and hailing the First Step Act for introducing
tools to the federal system); Evidence-Based Sentencing, CTR. FOR SENT'G INITIATIVES, https://www.nc
sc.org/microsites/csi/home/Evidence-Based-Sentencing.aspx [https://perma.cc/3XRH-9DM2]
(policymakers); J.C. Oleson, Risk in Sentencing: Constitutionally Suspect Variables and Evidence-
Based Sentencing, 64 SMU L. REV. 1329, 1336-37 (2011) (encouraging use of actuarial risk tools at
sentencing).
3. See, e.g., PA. COMM'N ON SENTENCING, RISK/NEEDS ASSESSMENT PROJECT: INTERIM
REPORT 4: DEVELOPMENT OF RISK ASSESSMENT SCALE 2 (2012), http://pcs.1a.psu.edu/publications-and
-research/research-and-evaluation-reports/risk-assessment/phase-i-reports/interim-report-4-developme
nt-of-risk-assessment-scale/view [https://perma.cc/PBE9-CQYR].
4. See, e.g., JENNIFER K. ELEK ET AL., CTR. FOR SENTENCING INITIATIVES, USING RISK AND
NEEDS ASSESSMENT INFORMATION AT SENTENCING: OBSERVATIONS FROM TEN JURISDICTIONS app.
(2015), https://www.ncsc.org/-/media/Microsites/Files/CSI/RNA%202015/Final%20PEW%2ORepor
t%20updated%2010-5-15.ashx [https://perma.cc/VE9R-5EAP] (reporting ambivalent results from
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emphasis on risk will not reduce crime or incarceration.' Yet tools continue
to proliferate as a pragmatic and "smart" sentencing reform in the face of
growing bipartisan pressures to reduce reliance on incarceration.6
Several debates swirl around tool proliferation as a policy matter, in
scholarship, and in the courts.7 These debates are shaped by what this
Article describes as the standard narrative of technological advancement.
Advocates suggest that integrating this technology into the sentencing
process is a natural step; an automated assessment of risk improves upon
clinical-meaning unstructured-risk assessments and ensures the efficient
allocation of resources.8 These claims fit within the standard narrative about
technology and society: technological improvements make tool use more
acceptable and in fact preferable to human judgment. Logically, then,
debates focus on whether and what makes tools more or less technically
accurate. If the tools are accurate, or at least more accurate than older
iterations, then their value at sentencing appears impervious.
Yet, this Article argues that current debates about actuarial risk tools as
sentencing reform are incomplete. Sentencing technologies have an effect
on society that current debates fail to consider. This Article asserts that
technological sentencing reforms change the social concepts that shape
punishment and society. It identifies pivotal shifts in the meaning of socially
conceived ideas central to punishment spurred by the introduction of
technology itself 9 In analyzing the social mutations, this Article
demonstrates two points: (1) the conceptual shifts sustain further
implementing a risk-and-needs tool at sentencing); Megan Stevenson & Jennifer Doleac, Algorithmic
Risk Assessment in the Hands ofHumans (Feb. 6, 2019) (on file with author) (providing similar results
for state of Virginia).
5. Actuarial risk tools at sentencing are sometimes discussed as "evidence-based sentencing."
This term is misleading as it suggests that (1) judges do not consider evidence at sentencing already; and
(2) the tools are supported by evidence that their use reduces crime. The first is patently false and the
second is not borne out by data. In fact, there is reason to believe emphasis on risk will not reduce crime.
See AGAINST PREDICTION, supra note 1. This Article will not perpetuate those misconceptions, and so
it does not use the term. For insight to how "rehabilitative" risk tools may not reduce the pressures of
mass incarceration, see Jessica M. Eaglin, Against Neorehabilitation, 66 SMU L. REv. 189 (2013)
[hereinafter Eaglin, Against Neorehabilitation]. For a study illustrating that implementing risk tools has
not reduced overall incarceration in Virginia, see Stevenson & Doleac, supra note 4.
6. See infra Part I.A.
7. See infra Part I.B.
8. By clinical, I mean a model of prediction or diagnosis that is unstructured and primarily relies
on the subjective judgment of an individual decisionmaker. See infra note 35 and accompanying text.
For critiques that encourage risk tools as part of a path towards modernizing sentencing, see Richard P.
Kern & Mark H. Bergstrom, A View from the Field: Practitioners' Response to Actuarial Sentencing:
An "Unsettled" Proposition, 25 FED. SENT'G REP. 185, 186 (2013) (noting that actuarial risk tools fit
into a modem trend toward prioritizing crime reduction and cost savings); Jordan M. Hyatt et al., Reform
in Motion: The Promise and Perils of Incorporating Risk Assessments and Cost-Benefit Analysis into
Pennsylvania Sentencing, 49 DUQ. L. REV. 707, 711-13 (2011) (emphasizing that formalized risk
predictions can save Pennsylvania money while improving current sentencing practices).
9. See infra Part I.C.
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technological expansion; and (2) these conceptual shifts also obscure and
legitimate problematic features of the sociohistorical phenomenon of mass
incarceration. Thus, this Article concludes that actuarial risk tools as
sentencing reform present a deeper threat than advocates or critics currently
acknowledge.'o As a technological sentencing reform, the tools threaten to
strip society of the language to resist the status quo. By changing our
conceptions of justice, the tools alter the foundation to critique societal
problems sustaining mass incarceration.
This Article identifies and analyzes three social concepts that were
altered through the proliferation of sentencing technologies. First,
"rehabilitation" changed. Once connoting an egalitarian notion of
reintegration and reform, the concept now refers to behavior management
through government surveillance. The introduction of technology hollowed
out this social concept. It now shares striking resemblance to incapacitation,
meaning removal of the opportunity to commit crime in the future through
punitive intervention. Yet because the term retains its positive association,
society is less willing to critically engage with risk tools' advance. It also
naturalizes the expansion of castigatory government surveillance into
marginalized communities. Second, the meaning of racial justice mutated.
The term once referred to concerns about arbitrary sentencing and the
impact of racialized inequities on sentence outcomes. The introduction of
sentencing technologies facilitated interpreting those inequities as natural.
As such, sentencing technologies reified structural racism under the auspice
of scientific objectivity. It also deified "technical formalism"-meaning
here a resistance to engagement with tools in the context of societal realities.
This has reduced the normative basis to limit sentencing technologies. It
also legitimates the survival of racialized punishment practices that
disproportionately affect minorities. Third, the terms danger and risk
converged in social meaning. Whereas the two words once had different
meanings, they are now considered the same concept in the context of
punishment. This conflation strips society of the ability to discern a
distinction between threat of actual harm and transformations in the realities
of punishment and society. It also legitimates the expansion of the carceral
net.
By illuminating these conceptual changes, this Article provides an
important but underappreciated reason to resist risk tools as sentencing
reform. In historical context, enthusiasm for the proliferation of statistically
robust actuarial risk tools now generates from a persistent tendency to seek
10. But see AGAINST PREDICTION, supra note 1, at 188-92 (critiquing how the actuarial paradigm
changes notions of justice). This Article expands on Harcourt's insight in two ways. First, it critiques
the rise of actuarial risk tools in the context of technological sentencing reforms more broadly. Second,
it specifies and analyzes transformations in social concepts that inform notions of justice.
2019] 487
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technical solutions to sociopolitical problems laid bare at sentencing. Some
consider this as the tools' strength as sentencing reform.1" These advocates
suggest that actuarial risk tools provide a foundation for a bipartisan and
depoliticized shift away from mass incarceration. Such claims, even if
offered for a beneficent purpose, are a ruse. Implementing risk tools has
costs we all bear-it changes us. Institutionalizing actuarial risk
assessments threatens to diffuse political momentum for broader reform by
excising social issues from debates. Worse still, sentencing technologies
change the language with which society understands human interactions.
For those who genuinely want to address the sociohistorical phenomenon
of mass incarceration as the status quo, the language to do so is more limited.
"Fixing the tools" cannot fix this pernicious but unquantifiable outcome.12
Thus, this Article urges advocates and lawmakers to resist this reform
despite its bipartisan appeal. It also raises broader issues of punishment and
society implicated by risk tools' proliferation but obscured from current
debates by the standard narrative. This includes the effect of automation
inside and outside the punishment context and its relationship to a shifting
governmentality.
Ultimately, this contribution invites a more holistic discussion of
sentencing reforms on the basis of our human values, not technological
possibilities. In the process, it enters three pressing discussions about
punishment and society. First, this Article connects scholars critiquing
pragmatic criminal justice reforms with those critiquing technological
reforms.1 3 In connecting the literatures, this contribution highlights that the
concerns of technological reforms are deeper than just stalling broader
reforms. The concern lies in changing our conceptions of justice. Second, it
speaks to scholars critiquing the actuarial shift. It is not enough to
destabilize risk tools by analyzing their effects on individual defendants.
This Article encourages a shift in focus to destabilize tools' effects on
11. See, e.g., JOHN F. PFAFF, LOCKED IN: THE TRUE CAUSES OF MASS INCARCERATION-AND
HOW TO ACHIEVE REAL REFORM 198-201 (2017) (encouraging adoption of actuarial risk tools as
sentencing reform); Kevin R. Reitz, "Risk Discretion" at Sentencing, 30 FED. SENT'G REP. 68 (2017)
(encouraging domestication of statistically robust risk tools in sentencing structures).
12. For a deeper discussion of the policy issues raised in developing risk tools for sentencing,
see Jessica M. Eaglin, Constructing Recidivism Risk, 67 EMORY L.J. 59 (2017) [hereinafter Eaglin,
Constructing].
13. For a critique of pragmatic sentencing reforms, see Benjamin Levin, The Consensus Myth in
Criminal Justice Reform, 117 MICH. L. REv. 259, 268-71 (2018) [hereinafter Levin, Consensus Myth]
(distinguishing between "over" and "mass" reforms). For a critique of technological reforms that
undercut larger debates about punishment and society, see Amna A. Akbar, Toward a Radical
Imagination ofLaw, 93 N.Y.U. L. REV. 405, 465-70 (2018) (critiquing police surveillance technologies
as detracting from necessary police reform). See generally MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW:
MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS 222, 226-31 (2010) (critiquing pragmatic
criminal justice reforms that avoid race and emphasizing that without structural reforms mass
incarceration as a system of subordination will rebound in new form).
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society over time. Finally, this intervention joins a growing movement to
recharge the humanities-here history and rhetoric-in the fight against
mass incarceration. 14 It demonstrates the need to find a language to discuss
this sociohistorical phenomenon that is broad enough to critique society, too.
Though "bottom up" empirical literature can offer important insight to how
law and technology interact on the ground, it means little without a language
to give those outputs meaning. By challenging a reform where debate is
dominated by discourse on statistical methods, this Article offers an
important illustration of need for that complementary humanist approach.
This Article unfolds in four parts. Part I introduces risk tools as a
sentencing reform and frames key debates about tools in the context of the
standard narrative about technological advancement. Part II destabilizes that
narrative. By examining the rise of actuarial risk assessments in previous
sentencing technologies since the 1960s to today, it illuminates obscured
social debate and context for the tools' advance. Part III offers the substance
of the counternarrative. It highlights transformations to social concepts
through and alongside the expansion of technological infrastructure. Part IV
discusses the value of this counternarrative and reframes debate for broader
discourse on punishment and society going forward.
I. THE RISE OF ACTUARIAL RISK TOOLS TO ADDRESS THE PRESSURES OF
MASS INCARCERATION
With more than 1.5 million people in prison and the majority individuals
of color, the United States remains squarely within the crisis of mass
incarceration.15 Since the 2000s, law and policymakers have been forced to
14. See Benjamin Levin, Rethinking the Boundaries of "Criminal Justice," 15 OHIO ST. J. CRIM.
L. 619, 631-37 (2018) (reviewing THE NEW CRIMINAL JUSTICE THINKING (Sharon Dolovich &
Alexandra Natapoff eds., 2017) and reflecting on methodological approaches to criminal justice critiques
and celebrating engagement from the humanities); Sara Mayeux, The Idea of "The Criminal Justice
System," 45 AM. J. CRIM. L. 55, 88-92 (2018) (noting the increasing role of historians in shaping legal
and social discourse on mass incarceration).
15. Between 1970 and 2010, the number of people incarcerated in state and federal prisons
jumped from 196 thousand to more than 1.6 million. Compare BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS
BULLETIN, PRISONERS 1925-81, at 2 tbl.1 (1982), with E. ANN CARSON, BUREAU OF JUSTICE
STATISTICS, PRISONERS IN2016, at 3 tbl.1 (2018). In 1950, the United States incarcerated just over 166
thousand people; today it incarcerates 1.5 million. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS BULLETIN, supra
note 15, at 2 tbl.1; CARSON, supra note 15, at 3 tbl. In 1978, the prison population was 51 percent
white, see BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS BULLETIN, supra note 15, at 4 tbl.3; today it is almost 60
percent black and brown, see CARSON, supra note 15, at 5 tbl.3. Though minimal decreases have
occurred in recent years, these reductions are largely attributed to court order for reductions in
Califomia's prison population, see Brown v. Plata, 563 U.S. 493 (2011), and federal sentencing
guideline revisions for the reduction of drug sentences, see Jessica M. Eaglin, The Drug Court Paradigm,
53 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 595 (2016) [hereinafter Eaglin, Paradigm]. Like the overall number of prisoners,
the racial disparities in prisons remains relatively stable compared to its exponential increase in recent
decades.
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confront the pressures mass incarceration places on the states.16 In the
process, "mass incarceration" has transformed into two overlapping but
diverging concepts. Some identify mass incarceration as a sociohistorical
phenomenon within which the criminal justice system has expanded and
facilitated the massive surveillance and incarceration of the U.S. population
with a particular focus on black communities in urban centers.17 Others
identify it as a social and economic mishap of incarcerating too many people
for too long for no good public safety reason." Though divergent in both
solutions and approach, "mass incarceration" is increasingly referred to as
a social problem that demands a bipartisan solution.' 9
A common bipartisan solution offered to address the pressures of mass
incarceration at sentencing is the expansion of actuarial risk assessment
tools. 20 This Part describes the advance of actuarial risk tools at sentencing
in relation to mass incarceration. Section A describes the proliferation of
actuarial risk tools as a pragmatic sentencing reform in recent years. Section
B introduces the technological advancement narrative that shapes discourse
on the tools as a legitimate sentencing reform in policy debates, court
rulings, and scholarship. Section C identifies this standard narrative's
shortcomings.
A. Actuarial Risk Tools as Sentencing Reform
Actuarial risk tools are meant to standardize not the sentence outcome
but the assessment of recidivism risk. The tools rely on static and dynamic
"risk factors" to standardize the assessment of the defendant's likelihood of
16. For explanation of the dynamics that make the states, more so than the federal govemment,
susceptible to economic pressures to confront the cost of corrections, see Rachel F. Barkow, Panel Four:
The Institutional Concerns Inherent in Sentencing Regimes: Federalism and the Politics ofSentencing,
105 COLUM. L. REV. 1276, 1305-06 (2005).
17. See generally ALEXANDER, supra note 13; LOIC WACQUANT, PUNISHING THE POOR: THE
NEOLIBERAL GOVERNMENT OF SOCIAL INSECURITY (2009); JONATHAN SIMON, GOVERNING THROUGH
CRIME: HOW THE WAR ON CRIME TRANSFORMED AMERICAN DEMOCRACY AND CREATED A CULTURE
OF FEAR (2007).
18. See Michael Waldman, Foreword to ENDING MASS INCARCERATION: IDEAS FROM TODAY'S
LEADERS, at vii, vii-viii (Inimai Chettiar & Priya Raghavan eds., 2019), https://www.brennancenter.org/
sites/default/files/publications/2019 EndingMassIncarceration digital.pdf [https://perma.cc/4SD9-2H
UV]; PFAFF, supra note 11, at 8 ("The criticisms over 'mass incarceration' essentially boil down to
claims that we have too many people in prison ... and that we should reduce that number. . . .").
19. Levin, Consensus Myth, supra note 13, at 262 (noting overlap and emphasizing significance
in distinction).
20. See, e.g., Cecelia Klingele, The Promises and Perils of Evidence-Based Corrections, 91
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 537, 539 (2015) (summarizing trends in sentencing and corrections). Note two
caveats here. First, actuarial risk tools are entering a variety of criminal justice contexts that are simply
outside the scope of this Article. For example, whether and how risk tools fit into pretrial detention
proceedings is not germane to the critique launched here, even if the implications of this project may
overlap. Second, introducing risk tools to sentencing is a common, but not the only and not yet necessary
reform either. See infra Part IV.A.
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engaging in specified behavior defined as "recidivism" in the future. Risk
factors can include anything that statistically correlates with the occurrence
of behavior defined as recidivism in observations of previously arrested or
convicted individuals. Common "static" factors-meaning those that
cannot be changed-include gender, age, and criminal history.2 1 Common
"dynamic" factors-meaning those that can be changed through
interventions-include antisocial attitudes, drug dependency, family ties,
social affiliation, education, and employment.2 2 Based on the presence or
absence of various factors accorded a predetermined weight, the tools
estimate individual defendants' "recidivism risk."
Tools vary in how they define recidivism, which is a fluid concept in the
criminal justice system.2 3 For purposes of this discussion, the most common
tools used at sentencing define recidivism as the likelihood of an individual
being rearrested for any behavior within a few years of release.24 Actuarial
tools rely on this previously collected data to produce a quantitative estimate
that people who share the defendant's characteristics will engage in
specified behavior in the future. 25 That estimate is derived from a
standardized assessment of various static and dynamic factors selected on
the basis of empirical research, convenience, and social policy. 26 Court
21. See Eaglin, Constructing, supra note 12, at 72 n.59.
22. See id
23. See id. at 75-78 (discussing various options and significance at sentencing).
24. Many actuarial risk tools used in the states classify defendants according to likelihood of
engaging in criminal behavior in the future. See id. at 75-78 (describing the definition used in various
tools used at sentencing). Some jurisdictions use "risk-and-needs assessment" tools as well. See Francis
T. Cullen, Rehabilitation: Beyond Nothing Works, 42 CRIME & JUST. 299, 349 (2013) (discussing the
risk-need-responsivity, or "RNR," paradigm in corrections); PEW CTR. ON THE STATES, RISK/NEEDS
ASSESSMENT 101: SCIENCE REVEALS NEW TOOLS TO MANAGE OFFENDERS 1-2 (2011), https://www.pe
wtrusts.org/-/media/legacy/uploadedfiles/pcs assets/201 I/pewriskassessmentbriefpdf.pdf [https://per
ma.cc/ST4Z-8DWW] (encouraging use of RNR approach in criminal justice administration, including
post-conviction sentencing). These tools not only predict whether a defendant will commit a crime in
the future, but identify their specific risks-like risk of drug abuse- -to inform decisions about treatment
needs. The distinction means little in the sentencing context (as opposed to corrections) as risk-and-
needs assessments facilitate incapacitative interventions just as much as traditional risk tools. See, e.g.,
State v. Loomis, 881 N.W.2d 749 (Wis. 2016) (court referencing risks and needs as part of rationale to
sentence defendant to longest term available under the statute of conviction).
25. See Eaglin, Constructing, supra note 12, at 85-87. Note that risk tools convey knowledge
about people like the defendant. See, e.g., Melissa Hamilton, Adventures in Risk: Predicting Violent and
Sexual Recidivism in Sentencing Law, 47 ARIZ. ST. L.J. I (2015); Sonja B. Starr, Evidence-Based
Sentencing and the Scientific Rationalization of Discrimination, 66 STAN. L. REV. 803 (2014)
[hereinafter Starr, Rationalization]. Moreover, risk tools do not predict what people like the defendant
do so much as predict what happens to people in the defendant's current situation. In other words, risk
tools estimate the likelihood of a defendant returning to the criminal justice apparatus on the basis of
other legal actors, like police, unless interventions occur. Even the most dynamic tools, then, are
somewhat static in their ability to predict the future given the uncertainty of human nature. See, e.g.,
Dawinder S. Sidhu, Moneyball Sentencing, 56 B.C. L. REV. 671 (2015) (critiquing how risk tools frame
defendants as static entities).
26. Advanced tools weight the factors differently, but some tools in use simply add a point for
the presence of select factors. Christopher Slobogin, A Defense of Modern Risk-Based Sentencing 7
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officials use such tools-which can be publicly or privately developed-to
calculate a qualitative risk score for an individual defendant.
Though a risk score does not define an outcome for a defendant at
sentencing, the tools are clearly meant to "control, order or influence the
behaviour of [the judge] .",27 Law and policymakers encourage judges to
consider actuarial risk tools' outcomes to "inform sentencing decisions
about appropriate community supervision, treatment interventions, and
services for the offender." 2 8 This translates into three primary functions for
the sentencing judge: the decision regarding the length of punishment and/or
community supervision, the location of that term through incarceration or
community supervision, and the imposition of conditions of supervision.29
Typically, judges will receive the actuarial risk tool's estimates as part of
the presentence report. That report, prepared by an officer of the court,
offers background information to the judge regarding the offense and
offender in advance of sentencing.
While risk assessment tools have been around and debated for decades,30
it was not until 2001 that a state-Virginia-incorporated an actuarial risk
assessment tool to directly shape judicial sentencing discretion. 3 1 By the late
2000s, several states began to follow suit as a part of an effort to reduce the
pressures of mass incarceration. Particularly after the 2008 economic crisis,
states' budgets were pinched and a newfound attention to criminal justice
reform emerged after decades of punitive policies. Public and private
coalitions began endorsing the use of publicly and privately developed
actuarial risk tools in the states as part of a comprehensive agenda to reduce
recidivism while saving states correctional costs. 3 2 By 2017, at least thirteen
(Vanderbilt Univ. Law Sch. Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 18-52, 2018), http
s://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=3242257 [hereinafter Slobogin, Defense]. For
discussion of the factors that go into a tool designer's decision to develop a tool, see Eaglin, Constructing,
supra note 12, at 79-80, 101-04.
27. Julia Black, Critical Reflections on Regulation, 27 AUSTRALIAN J. LEGAL PHIL. 1, 25 (2002).
28. Evidence-Based Sentencing, supra note 2 (promoting sentencing practices that protect the
public and reduce recidivism).
29. See, e.g., Erin Collins, Punishing Risk, 107 GEO. L.J. 57, 66 (2018) (discussing the role risk
tools play in ajudge's determination of length and location of a sentence) [hereinafter Collins, Punishing
Risk]; CAL. R. CT. 4.415(c) (permitting judges to consider risk assessments to determine length and
conditions of confinement); CTR. FOR SENTENCING INITIATIVES, USE OF RISK AND NEEDS ASSESSMENT
INFORMATION IN STATE SENTENCING PROCEEDINGS 3 (Sept. 2017), https://www.ncsc.org/-/media/Micr
osites/Files/CSI/EBS%20RNA%20briefo20Sep%202017.ashx [https://perma.cc/48TF-W3HC]
(endorsing use of risk and needs assessments to "craft[], modify[], and enforc[e] terms and conditions
of probation supervision").
30. See, e.g., AGAINST PREDICTION, supra note I (locating rise of actuarial techniques in parole
during the 1930s).
31. See BRIAN J. OSTROM, NAT'L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, OFFENDER RISK ASSESSMENT IN
VIRGINIA: A THREE STAGE EVALUATION (2002) (implemented in 2001, institutionalized 2002).
32. Klingele, supra note 20, at 538-39, 566 (discussing positions of NIC; JRI; private
organizations; philanthropists); see also Juliene James et al., A View from the States: Evidence-Based
Public Safety Legislation, 102 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 821, 837-39 (2012) (discussing convergence
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states required the use of actuarial risk tools at sentencing. 3 In 2017, the
American Law Institute endorsed the institutionalization of actuarial risk
tools into state sentencing structures.3 4 With this decision, risk tools promise
to further expand in coming years.
These tools are advanced as an improvement upon "clinical" assessments
of risk-meaning estimates of likelihood conducted by persons without
structure-including possibly judges at sentencing.35 The tools are meant to
"nudge" judges towards less punitive alternatives to incarceration for
defendants identified as low-risk. 3 6 Oppositely, tools should encourage
judges to increase sentences for higher-risk defendants on the basis that
. . 37criminal supervision is more necessary. In theory, considering this
information should reduce unnecessary reliance on incarceration. The idea
is that the tools identify low-risk offenders within certain categories of (low-
level and nonviolent) offenders particularly suited for diversion. This
information alerts judges to change their sentencing practices in line with
budgetary limits and the limited safety concerns.
of different actors to implement evidence-based criminal justice reforms, including actuarial risk
assessments at sentencing).
33. Notably, this likely underestimates the number of states that use actuarial risk tools now. It
only includes those states that statutorily require consideration of an actuarial risk tool as part of the
sentencing process. Compare Starr, Rationalization, supra note 25, at 809 n. 11 (compiling list of twenty
states that use risk tools), with Eaglin, Constructing, supra note 12, at 14-15 (noting the various ways
that risk tools enter sentencing).
34. MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 6B.09 (AM. LAW INST. 2017). Note that this Article
refers to the Model Penal Code: Sentencing provision on evidence-based sentencing presented in the
proposed final draft approved by the ALl in 2017. The final draft has not been released to the public as
of the date of this Article's publication. See Model Penal Code: Sentencing, Proposed Final Draft
(Approved May 2017), ROBINA INST. (June 5, 2017), https://robinainstitute.umn.edu/publications/model
-penal-code-sentencing-proposed-final-draft-approved-may-2017 [https://perma.cc/Y7N8-Y3 PW].
35. See, e.g., Hamilton, supra note 25, at 8 (distinguishing clinical and actuarial assessments as
line between unstructured and structured decisionmaking about risk); see also PAUL E. MEEHL,
CLINICAL VERSUS STATISTICAL PREDICTION (1954) (foundational research on distinction).
36. On Amir & Orly Lobel, Stumble, Predict, Nudge: How Behavioral Economics Informs Law
and Policy, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 2098 (2008); RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE:
IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS (2008). In these instances, the
information from the tool would encourage judges to reduce sentences, allow community-based
sanctions, and inform particular treatment mandates. The internal regulatory mechanisms at play include
anything other than a direct command, including such factors as shaming, fear of crime, and fear of
public backlash. See Kelly Hannah-Moffat, Actuarial Sentencing: An "Unsettled" Proposition, 30 JUST.
Q. 270, 289-90 (2013) ("It is possible that those who promote risk approaches do not share the goal of
reducing crime or of matching offenders with the programs that 'work,' but rather who seek only to
manage populations defensibly.").
37. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 6B.09 cmt. e (endorsing this practice); Sonja
B. Starr, The Odds ofJustice: Actuarial Risk Prediction and the Criminal Justice System, 29 CHANCE
49, 51 (2016) (summarizing empirical study of students assessing risk tools that demonstrates they are
more punitive when presented with a higher risk score for the same offense); see also Collins, Punishing
Risk, supra note 29, at 68-69 (discussing a Wisconsin case where the judge later reduced a sentence
after reflecting on the anchoring effect of the risk score towards a more severe sentence).
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States are incorporating risk tools into the sentencing process in a variety
of ways and to varying degrees based upon the unique state structure. In
Virginia, for example, the tools are adopted as a structured component to
the sentencing process. 38 There are two risk tools that operate in the state in
tandem with the state's advisory sentencing guidelines. 39 Court
administrators attach the state's nonviolent offender risk assessment to
presentence reports for defendants convicted of specific drug and property
offenses. 40 The assessment sheet characterizes defendants as high-,
medium-, or low-risk on the basis of an eleven-factor weighted assessment
developed with data from Virginia itself.4 1 Defendants identified as low-risk
are automatically recommended for diversion from prison to alternative
sanctions, which include jail, probation, and other incapacitative
alternatives to incarceration.42 The second tool, designed for sex offenders
specifically, can increase the range of the sentence that a defendant can
expect under the state's sentencing guidelines for certain sex crimes.43 The
Model Penal Code: Sentencing endorses this structured approach to risk-
based sentencing. 44
Most other states incorporate risk tools in a less structured manner. In
Ohio, the state endorses the adoption of actuarial risk tools created by a
state-endorsed public institution. 4 While the state retains sentencing
guidelines to inform their discretion, judges are mandated to consider
actuarial risk tools as part of the sentencing process if the judge orders a
38. OSTROM, supra note 31, at 9-10; Richard P. Kern & Meredith Farrar-Owens, Sentencing
Guidelines with Integrated Offender Risk Assessment, 25 FED. SENT'G REP. 176, 176-78 (2013).
39. OSTROM, supra note 31, at 23-26; Kern & Farrar-Owens, supra note 38, at 176-79.
40. OSTROM,supra note 31, at 51-56; Kern & Farrar-Owens, supra note 38, at 176-77.
41. OSTROM, supra note 31, at 27, 44.
42. BRANDON L. GARRETT ET AL., VA. CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY REFORM PROJECT,
NONVIOLENT RISK ASSESSMENT IN VIRGINIA SENTENCING: THE SENTENCING COMMISSION DATA 4-7
(2018).
43. Kern & Farrar-Owens, supra note 38, at 177-79.
44. MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 6B.09 and cmt. d-e (AM. LAW INST. 2017) (endorsing
Virginia's approach to incorporating actuarial risk tools at sentencing). Other states have attempted to
follow in Virginia's footsteps in recent years. For example, Pennsylvania is in the final stages of
developing an actuarial risk tool for sentencing after years of study and notice-and-comment. PA.
COMM'N ON SENTENCING, PROPOSED SENTENCE RISK ASSESSMENT INSTRUMENT (2019), http://pcs.1a.p
su.edu/guidelines/proposed-sentence-risk-assessment-instrument/proposed-sentence-risk-assessment-i
nstrument-published-july-20-2019 [https://perma.cc/9CHN-XVKS]. Wisconsin also adopted a
commercial risk tool in hopes of replicating Virginia's sentencing process while saving money. Joe
Fontaine, A History of Wisconsin Sentencing-Part XXVI, CORRECTIONS SENTENCING (May 18, 2007,
1:04 PM), http://correctionssentencing.blogspot.com/2007/05/history-of-wisconsin-sentencing-part 18.
html [https://perma.cc/G2SG-BUZ2].
45. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5120.114(A) (West 2019) (requiring that courts use the Ohio
Risk Assessment System (ORAS) risk tool if a "court orders an assessment of an offender for
sentencing"); OHIO ADMIN. CODE 5120-13-01 (2019) (codifying Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and
Correction's selection of ORAS); see also Eaglin, Constructing, supra note 12, at 70-71 (discussing
origin of ORAS in public-private partnership with University of Cincinnati).
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presentence investigation report. 46 In Missouri, the state sentencing
commission provides the outcome of an actuarial risk tool's assessment in
all sentence reports as part of its sentencing information structure.4 7 The tool
is developed by the commission, administered on all defendants, and
provided to the judge along with a report on cost savings. 4 8
Though this trend is controversial, it appears to have traction. The role
of predictions of future dangerousness in the distribution of punishment was
highly contentious in the 1970s and 1980s. 49 Notions of selective
incapacitation-the idea that incapacitating high-risk offenders would save
costs and reduce crime-have been sharply criticized on basis of cost and
social justice concerns.50 More recently, scholars and policymakers have
spoken out against the proliferation of risk tools at sentencing, often
attracting much criticism.5 Despite meaningful critiques, enthusiasm for
the tools' advance remains constant.
46. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5120.114(A) (introducing risk tool to sentencing); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. §§ 2929.13-18 (West 2019) (providing sentencing guidance to the courts for noncapital
convictions).
47. The Missouri Sentencing Advisory Commission provides judges with specific information
about past practices to encourage judges to exercise discretion consistently. Ryan W. Scott, The Skeptic's
Guide to Information Sharing at Sentencing, 2013 UTAH L. REV. 345, 355-56. It maintains an interactive
website that allows judges to input information about a defendant. Id. at 356, 386. Depending on the
factors put into the computer, a judge will see how other judges sentenced a defendant in similar
circumstances. Id. at 386-390. Note that Missouri adheres to a "sentencing information system" that
developed as an alternative to the guidelines movement. Id. at 346-47. These critiques concerning
information systems have more to do with the method of implementation rather than the introduction of
risk technologies in general. See id at 347.
48. Michael A. Wolff, Missouri Provides Cost of Sentences and Recidivism Data: What Does
Cost Have to Do with Justice?, 24 FED. SENT'G REP. 161, 162 (2012).
49. For example, predictions of future dangerousness were hotly contested as states like Texas
introduced jury assessment of risk as part of their structured guidance for capital sentencing. See Jurek
v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976). In the noncapital context, the role of risk predictions is deeply intertwined
with structural changes in sentencing guidelines that occurred in the 1970s-80s along with the move
away from rehabilitation-focused reforms. See infra Part 11. For an overview of the scholarly debate, see
Marc Miller & Norval Morris, Predictions of Dangerousness: An Argument for Limited Use, 3
VIOLENCE & VICTIMS 263, 263 (1988).
50. See Michael Tonry, Purposes and Functions ofSentencing, 34 CRIME & JUST. 1, 30 (2006)
("The prediction methods proposed were so over-inclusive, producing so many 'false positives,' that
selective incapacitation was dismissed as impracticable."); Paul H. Robinson, Commentary, Punishing
Dangerousness: Cloaking Preventive Detention as Criminal Justice, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1429, 1432
(2001) ("[T]he basic features of the criminal justice system make it a costly yet ineffective preventive
detention system.").
51. It is important to emphasize here that these critiques focus exclusively on sentencing. Anna
Maria Barry-Jester et al., The New Science ofSentencing, MARSHALL PROJECT (Aug. 4,2015, 7:15 AM),
https://www.themarshallproject.org/2015/08/04/the-new-science-of-sentencing [https://perma.cc/258C
-45JL]; Sonja B. Starr, Op-Ed, Sentencing, by the Numbers, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 11, 2014, at A17;
Attorney General Eric Holder, Remarks at the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers 57th
Annual Meeting and 13th State Criminal Justice Network Conference (Aug. 1, 2014), https://www.justic
e.gov/opa/speech/attorney-general-eric-holder-speaks-national-association-criminal-defense-lawyers-5
7th [https://perma.cc/VJX3-Y345] [hereinafter Holder, Remarks].
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B. The Technological Advancement Narrative
Actuarial risk tools enjoy broad enthusiasm for their use in part because
a narrative of technological advancement shapes debates about the tools in
policy circles, academic scholarship, and the courts. This section identifies
the narrative and illuminates its impact on debates in these three arenas.
There is a standard narrative about technological advancement in society.
The narrative is as follows: Technology fixes problems by standardizing
outcomes. As technology improves, humans are more capable of relying
upon it without human costs. 5 2 This narrative creates an orientation around
how the tools improve and the ways we measure those tools. It detracts
focus from the effects tools have on society. Implicitly, we presume that
better tools mean a better society.
This technological advancement narrative is imprinted onto debates
about actuarial risk tools as sentencing reform. The notion is that states have
been using the wrong tool or not enough tools at sentencing. Advocates and
critics alike focus on how new risk assessments are improved, often
emphasizing how technological advances make tools more accurate at
predicting outcomes-be it because the datasets are larger, the computers
are faster, or the algorithms are more complex. 5 3 This emphasis on technical
accuracy comports with the standard narrative about technology.
For example, policymakers emphasize that risk tools offer a costless way
to fix existing problems at sentencing. Consider the developers of the Ohio
risk assessment system who emphasize that implementing standardized risk
assessments prevents the potential of arbitrary decisionmaking if individual
judges do assess risk.54 The National Center for State Courts underscores
how risk tools can reduce unnecessary reliance on incarceration by
objectively identifying those offenders most capable of diversion.55 Key to
the policy argument is the "costless" component of the technological
advancement narrative. For example, the American Law Institute (ALI)
recently suggested that given the current state of criminal justice, risk tools
52. For an interesting take on the origin of this belief, see generally HUNTER HEYCK, AGE OF
SYSTEM: UNDERSTANDING THE DEVELOPMENT OF MODERN SOCIAL SCIENCE (2015).
53. Compare Starr, Rationalization, supra note 25, at 806 (critiquing statistically robust actuarial
tools as new way to rationalize discrimination at sentencing), with Aziz Z. Huq, Racial Equity in
Algorithmic Criminal Justice, 68 DUKE L.J. 1043, 1060-62 (2019) (characterizing introduction of new
big data techniques to criminal justice as inevitable). See also Collins, Punishing Risk, supra note 29, at
74-75 (describing proponents' endorsement of risk predictions due to increased accuracy).
54. See, e.g., Edward J. Latessa et al., The Creation and Validation of the Ohio Risk Assessment
System (ORAS), 74 FED. PROB. 16, 17 (2010) ("[O]ne of the purposes of ORAS was to promote
consistent and objective assessment of the risk of recidivism for offenders in Ohio.").
55. CTR. FOR SENTENCING INITIATIVES, supra note 29 (highlighting California and Netherland
studies finding that tools' use led to decreased reliance on incarceration and more diversion while
attributing ambivalent results in its ten jurisdiction study to lack of data).
[VOL. 97:483496
DISTORTED CONCEPTIONS OF PUNISHMENT
provide an objective means to cope with the pressures of mass
incarceration. 6 The ALI notes that risk tools can save limited financial
resources and avoid victimization. As they explain,
[i]f used as a tool to encourage sentencing judges to divert low-risk
offenders from prisons to community sanctions, risk assessments
conserve scarce prison resources for the most dangerous offenders,
reduce the overall costs of the corrections system, and avoid the
human costs of unneeded confinement to offenders, offenders'
families, and communities.5 7
Incorporating actuarial risk tools into sentencing also avoids
victimization because "[i]f prediction technology shown to be reasonably
accurate is not employed, and crime-preventive terms of confinement are
not imposed, the justice system knowingly permits victimizations in the
community that could have been avoided."58 Moreover, because the tools
are more accurate than humans based on fifty years of social science
research, the ALI suggests that incorporating risk tools is a pragmatic
reform supported by data-driven research. 59 Though not indicative of all
policy perspectives on the matter, these endorsements are representative of
leading justifications for tool adoption.
This narrative fuels policy debates' emphasis on accuracy as well. For
example, risk tools appeared frequently in the news after ProPublica
published a report and article suggesting that the tools are racially biased. 6 0
As the report suggested, popular tools like COMPAS miscategorize black
defendants as high risk more frequently than white defendants. 61 The tools
stayed in the news when tool developers responded with reports that
COMPAS is technically accurate regardless of race. 62 At the same time, this
narrative operates to displace policy critiques that do not emphasize
accuracy. As an example, when then-Attorney General Eric Holder
critiqued risk tools as being anathema to our criminal justice values, he was
56. See, e.g., Slobogin, Defense, supra note 26; see also MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING
§ 6B.09 (AM. LAW INST. 2017); Kelly Hannah-Moffat, Punishment and Risk, in THE SAGE HANDBOOK
OF PUNISHMENT AND SOCIETY 129 (Jonathan Simon & Richard Sparks eds., 2013) [hereinafter Hannah-
Moffat, Punishment] (genealogy of tools and cautious optimism).
57. MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 6B.09 cmt. d.
58. Id. at cmt. e.
59. Id. at cmt. a.
60. See Julia Angwin et al., Machine Bias, PROPUBLICA (May 23, 2016), http://www.propublic
a.org/article/machine-bias-risk-assessments-in-criminal-sentencing [https://perma.cc/NBA7-4WF8].
61. Id.
62. See WILLIAM DIETERICH ET AL., NORTHPOINTE, COMPAS RISK SCALES: DEMONSTRATING
ACCURACY EQUITY AND PREDICTIVE PARITY (2016), http://go.volarisgroup.com/rs/430-MBX-989/ima
ges/ProPublicaCommentary Final_07061 6.pdf [https://perma.cc/CH8Z-5X6V].
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excoriated. 6 3 Primary among the responses were studies demonstrating tool
accuracy. It is as if the accuracy of the tool defines our criminal justice
values.
Notable academic debates, too, adhere to the technological advancement
narrative. Scholars are quick to tell you how much the tools have changed
in the last fifty years. 64 Indeed, genealogies of risk technology are
pervasive. 5 Scholarship details how tools have advanced to predict more
accurately and assess more things than just risk, including needs.6 6 To be
sure, vigorous debates continue regarding improvements in the data,6 7
accuracy and reliability of the outcomes, 68 and the connection between
production of information and implementation. 69 Further analysis connects
these debates to how it relates to sentencing. Yet these arguments suggest
that if the tools are getting better, then it is time for humans to catch up by
using them correctly. These scholars often, but not always, expand focus
beyond actuarial risk tools as sentencing reform. Rather, tool proliferation
at sentencing is just one of many "algorithmic" reforms meant to improve
the administration of criminal justice.7 '
Alternatively, punishment scholars are keen to focus on actuarial risk
tools' overlap with criminal history. Advocates emphasize that criminal
63. See Holder, Remarks, supra note 51; Jessica Eaglin, May the Odds Be (Never) in Minorities'
Favor? Breaking Down the Risk-Based Sentencing Divide, HUFFPOST (Aug. 22, 2014, 12:30 PM), https:
//www.huffpost.com/entry/may-the-odds-be-never-in b_5697651 [https:/perma.cc/H9GV-ZB7M]
(summarizing responding critiques).
64. See, e.g., Christopher Slobogin, The Civilization ofthe Criminal Law, 58 VAND. L. REV. 121,
144- 56 (2005) (emphasizing that "risk management techniques, like risk assessment methods, have
improved immensely over the past few decades" as basis for prevention-oriented sentencing); Slobogin,
Defense, supra note 26, at 3, 13-14 (emphasizing improved accuracy of risk tools over time and over
human judgment).
65. For genealogies of the tools, see, e.g., Hannah-Moffat, Punishment, supra note 56, at 132-
37; Jonathan Simon, Reversal of Fortune: The Resurgence of Individual Risk Assessment in Criminal
Justice, I ANN. REV. L. & Soc. Sc. 397, 414 15 (2005).
66. See, e.g., Cullen, supra note 24, at 335-46 (describing the emergence of risk and needs
assessments).
67. See, e.g., Wayne A. Logan & Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Policing Criminal Justice Data,
101 MINN. L. REV. 541 (2016) (identifying issues with data collected in criminal justice administration).
68. See, e.g., Huq, supra note 53, at 1113-15 (detailing challenges to measuring whether tools
are accurate on the basis of racial justice).
69. See, e.g., Megan Stevenson, Assessing Risk Assessment in Action, 103 MINN. L. REV. 303
(2018); Brandon L. Garrett & John Monahan, Judging Risk, 108 CALIF. L. REV. (forthcoming 2019), htt
ps://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=3190403.
70. See, e.g., Slobogin, Defense, supra note 26 (advancing his fit, validity, and fairness principles
for sentencing and policing); John Monahan & Jennifer L. Skeem, Risk Assessment in Criminal
Sanctioning, 12 ANN. REV. CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 489, 491-93 (2016); accord Collins, Punishing Risk,
supra note 29, at 61 (warning that tools created for corrections present an off purpose use at sentencing);
Eaglin, Constructing, supra note 12 (warning that tool construction implicates sentencing policy).
71. See, e.g., Anupam Chander, The Racist Algorithm?, 115 MICH. L. REV. 1023 (2017); Huq,
supra note 53, at 1045 (noting expansion of predictive technologies at various points in the criminal
justice process).
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history is used as a crude predictor of recidivism risk.72 If actuarial risk tools
are better than criminal history at predicting risk, then the tools should be
implemented at sentencing.73 In essence, this is the "this is what we've
always done" argument. It silences the philosophical and public policy
reality that states have, until recently, focused on criminal history at
sentencing to the exclusion of various risk factors. 74 For example,
Pennsylvania's Sentencing Commission chose to focus on criminality as
measured by "two paramount cntena: seriousness of the (current) offense,
and the offender's criminal history" in development of its sentencing
guidelines. It excluded various other common sentencing factors that
could predict future behavior, including those related to poverty.76 Yet
today the state's commissioners have, until recently, encouraged use of tools
that include such factors.77 What matters is whether and how many factors
can be included to maintain a satisfactory level of social scientific accuracy
rather than whether and how many factors converge with or contradict
sentencing policy. This, too, illuminates an orientation toward technical
accuracy that only makes sense within the narrative of technological
advancement.
This narrative bleeds into the courts as well. Putting aside the question
of how to challenge tools in court, it is clear that courts are focusing on
technical accuracy. Actuarial risk tools consider factors excluded from
sentencing policy due to constitutional concern or public policy
disapproval.7 1 Such factors may include gender, age, and socioeconomic
72. Nancy J. King, Sentencing and Prior Convictions: The Past, the Future, and the End of the
Prior-Conviction Exception to Apprendi, 97 MARQ. L. REV. 523, 539-40 (2014).
73. See, e.g., RICHARD S. FRASE, JUST SENTENCING: PRINCIPLES AND PROCEDURES FOR A
WORKABLE SYSTEM (2012); King, supra note 72, at 544.
74. See, e.g., AGAINST PREDICTION, supra note 1, at 96-98 (noting the trend toward using
criminal history as risk factors); King, supra note 72, at 541-42; Michael Tonry, Legal and Ethical
Issues in the Prediction ofRecidivism, 26 FED. SENT'G REP. 167, 168 (2014) [hereinafter Tonry, Issues]
(observing trend toward narrowing predictive factors on criminal history).
75. Mona Lynch & Alyse Bertenthal, The Calculus of the Record: Criminal History in the
Making of US Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 20 THEORETICAL CRIMINOLOGY 145, 151 (2016)
(quoting letter authored by DA Jones, Pennsylvania Commission on Sentencing 1986).
76. See id. (noting that the state commissioner considered other offender characteristics like
"falsely claimed poverty" as "absurd").
77. Compare PENNSYLVANIA COMM'N ON SENTENCING, SPECIAL REPORT: THE IMPACT OF
REMOVING AGE, GENDER, AND COUNTY FROM THE RISK ASSESSMENT SCALE 1 (2015), http://pcs.1
a.psu.edu/publications-and-research/risk-assessment/phase-ii-reports/special-report-impact-of-removin
g-demographic-factors/view [https://perma.cc/TGG9-T3R6] (encouraging retention of age, gender, and
county in state-developed risk assessment tool), with Pennsylvania Comm'n on Sentencing, Proposed
Sentence Risk Assessment Instrument, 204 PA. CODE §§ 305.1-305.9 (2019) (proposed tool retains only
age and gender as demographic risk factors).
78. Eaglin, Against Neorehabilitation, supra note 5, at 215 (policy claim); Starr, Rationalization,
supra note 25, at 805 (making constitutional, methodological, and policy claim); Sidhu, supra note 25
(making statutory claim based on the federal Sentencing Reform Act).
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status. 9 Yet because the tools are offered under the umbrella of risk and risk
is not connected to a specific sentencing outcome, courts have resisted
consideration of their construction as a substantive matter. For example, in
Malenchik v. State, the Indiana Supreme Court explicitly located technical
accuracy at the center of its ruling about actuarial risk tools' advance at
sentencing.so In a more recent decision, State v. Loomis, the Wisconsin
Supreme Court converged on the history of risk tools' advancement and the
possibility of technical accuracy when denying a defendant's constitutional
due process challenges to actuarial risk tools used at sentencing. 81
Consistent with the standard narrative, the court concluded that
consideration of more technically accurate risk tools is beneficial to both
the criminal justice system and the defendant. 8 2 This remained persuasive
to the court even though the defendant explicitly objected to tool use, even
if the tool was accurate.
In summary, the orientation around accuracy is the technological
advancement narrative at work in sentencing reform debates. Through it,
the pursuit of technical knowledge is defining and shaping sentencing,
rather than sentencing shaping and defining the pursuit of technical
knowledge. Within the narrative, this development is minimized; it is even
worthy of celebration. The implicit conclusion is this: technology is
changing and we should change with it. The following section sets the
foundation to complicate that conclusion.
79. It is the intersection of all three that implicates racialized concerns of structural inequity.
While discussed more explicitly below, it is well understood that the sociohiostorical phenomenon of
mass incarceration affects geographically and racially marginalized populations the most. See supra
notes 15-20 and accompanying text (defining contours of mass incarceration). Thus, risk factors that
implicate the intersections of structural disadvantage are also racially inflected. See infra Part IlI.B.
80. Malenchik v. State, 928 N.E.2d 564 (Ind. 2010). Anthony Malenchik pled guilty to receiving
stolen goods and being a habitual offender. Id. at 566. The trial judge sentenced him to six years
imprisonment with two years suspended- the maximum sentence available given defendant's plea
agreement. Id. In explaining its decision, the court referenced the outcome of two popular actuarial risk
assessment tools, the Level of Service Inventory-Revised (LSI-R) and Substance Abuse Subtle
Screening Inventory (SASSI), included in the defendant's presentence investigation report. Id. at 566-
67. Defendant appealed the sentence to Indiana's Supreme Court. Id. at 566. There, the court considered
a variety of challenges to use of information produced by actuarial risk tools, some raised by the
defendant and several raised by amici as well. Id. at 567 73.
81. State v. Loomis, 881 N.W.2d 749 (Wis. 2016). Eric Loomis pled guilty to fleeing a police
officer and operating a car without the owner's consent. Id. at 754. The trial court imposed the maximum
sentence available under the statute. Id. at 756-57. The trial court, explaining its decision, referenced
the outcome of another popular actuarial risk assessment tool, the Correctional Offender Management
Profiling for Alternative Sanctions (COMPAS), as a relevant factor. Id. at 753--55. Loomis appealed his
sentence. Id. at 757. The appellate court certified appeal to the Wisconsin Supreme Court, which issued
its decision in July 2016. Id.
82. Id. at 766-67.
83. Id. at 765.
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C. The Narrative's Shortcoming
These debates are lopsided, but the technological advancement narrative
obscures their one-sided nature. To be sure, the technology around actuarial
risk tools is changing. The datasets are getting bigger, the algorithms are
getting more complex, and the computers are getting stronger. 84 But to
characterize those technological advancements as the basis for the
expansion of actuarial risk tools overlooks how human values and realism
once combined to limit the incorporation of risk technologies into
sentencing structures. This is no small step in the expansion of actuarial
techniques. Rather, it reflects a significant transformation in and of itself.
To start, it is not a foregone conclusion that technological advancements
improve sentencing or society. The narrative orients focus around debates
of technical accuracy, as much scholarship and public policy does. It
assumes social benefits. Debates on technical accuracy of tools cannot
encompass the full implications of risk tools entering sentencing, a point I
develop more fully in Part IV. That focus obscures critical transformations
that have occurred in society facilitated through a turn toward technology.
This standard narrative, or discourse, has the effect of masking social
transformations which only historical content can illuminate. 8 As a
political tactic, it neutralizes the importance of history as a reason for pause
now.
Yet history is a critical component to the standard narrative. In policy
debates, scholarship, and court rulings, advocates draw on history to bolster
their claims of tool legitimacy as sentencing reform. For example, the ALI
draws from the 1962 Model Penal Code references to persistent offenders
and dangerous, mentally abnormal defendants to suggest that consideration
of recidivism risk is not new, but perhaps more constrained with the
adoption of a tool. 8 6 Scholars similarly suggest that tool use is at least more
transparent than past practices. Furthermore, they may emphasize use of
84. For an overview of that literature, see, for example, Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Policing
Predictive Policing, 94 WASH. U. L. REV. 1109 (2017).
85. Michel Foucault, Lecture One: 7 January 1976, in POWER/KNOWLEDGE 78 (Colin Gordon
ed., Colin Gordon et al. trans., 1980).
86. MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 6B.09 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 2017).
87. See, e.g., Reitz, supra note I1, at 69-71. There is a deep irony to this rationale. While risk
tools are meant to bring transparency to sentencing, the construction of most tools is incredibly
opaque-developers often refuse to release information about their design and the policy choices
embedded in the tools. See Eaglin, Constructing, supra note 12, at 147; Anne L. Washington, How to
Argue with an Algorithm: Lessons from the COMPAS-ProPublica Debate, 17 COLO. TECH. L.J. 131
(2018). The ALI rightfully encourages the use of risk tools developed by state agencies explicitly to
avoid this dilemma. MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 6B.09. This practice is the exception, not the
rule, among states adopting risk assessment tools for sentencing. See Eaglin, Constructing, supra note
12, at 147-51 (noting the opacity of many risk tools used at sentencing); see generally Rebecca Wexler,
Life, Liberty, and Trade Secrets: Intellectual Property in the Criminal Justice System, 70 STAN. L. REV.
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actuarial risk assessments in earlier punishment technologies while
critiquing tool detractors for their failure to account for this historical
reality.88 Together, these explanations suggest that because states already do
or should encourage risk-based sentencing, actuarial risk tools can improve
that practice.
The result is a deeply one-sided discourse about whether and why we
might limit or prohibit actuarial risk tools at sentencing. Advocates bolster
claims with the historical past practice argument while critics are quick to
sidestep their presence. In this debate, it is easy to overlook the decision by
states not to introduce actuarial risk tools at sentencing in the recent past
and why, a point discussed in the following Part. In this sense, both critics
and advocates are often selectively historical. Obscured by the narrative is
the simple historical reality that risk assessments may not be new, but our
orientation around technical accuracy is. This shift has everything to do with
changes in society left underscrutinized because of the narrative shaping
debates.
The remainder of this Article reignites history to destabilize this
pervasive standard narrative shaping risk tools debates. The aim is to use
the social history of punishment technologies to construct a novel
counternarrative. This, in turn, can facilitate a more balanced and holistic
debate about risk tools' proliferation today as part of any response to mass
incarceration.
This project builds from the work of scholars that have studied the rise
of actuarialism, meaning the preoccupation with statistical predictions of
risk.89 On the one hand, some scholars suggest that the orientation toward
risk is part of a larger shift toward managing offenders rather than
rehabilitating them in response to a loss of faith in government at the end of
the twentieth century. 90 As a "new penology" emerged in the 1970s with the
decline of rehabilitation, government shifted toward techniques of
aggregation and bureaucratization to manage groups rather than rehabilitate
individuals. 91 These scholars emphasize the darker side of this turn. The
largest problem with risk tools is the loss of individualized engagement on
the basis of the particulars of specific cases.
1343 (2018) (describing lack of transparency concerns in technologies proliferating across the entire
criminal justice system, including risk tools at sentencing).
88. See, e.g., Reitz, supra note I1, at 71 (critiquing "ahistorical condemnation" of risk tools at
sentencing).
89. See AGAINST PREDICTION, supra note 1, at I (defining actuarialism).
90. See generally DAVID GARLAND, THE CULTURE OF CONTROL: CRIME AND SOCIAL ORDER IN
CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY 53 73 (2001).
91. See Malcolm M. Feeley & Jonathan Simon, The New Penology, 30 CRIMINOLOGY 449,452
54 (1992) (noting rise of systems theory as part of a tum toward actuarial techniques); Malcolm Feeley
& Jonathan Simon, Actuarial Justice: The Emerging New Criminal Law, in THE FUTURES OF
CRIMINOLOGY 173, 185-93 (David Nelken ed., 1994) (exploring intellectual origin).
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Alternatively, some scholars locate the rise of actuarialism as the
problematic continuation of a path toward individualization rather than
away from it. In his foundational book, Against Prediction: Profiling,
Policing, and Punishing in an Actuarial Age, Bernard Harcourt examines
the rise of actuarial techniques in criminal justice since the 1930s. Contrary
to the aggregation critique, Harcourt attributes the rise of risk assessments
to the problematic but long-time dream of prediction, individualization, and
a will to know the criminal at sentencing. 92 As Harcourt suggests,
introducing these techniques into punishment is problematic not only
because of how they operate-by targeting populations and perhaps,
paradoxically, increasing crime-but also because of what they do to social
notions of justice.9 3
This Article draws on both these literatures to construct a
counternarrative focused on society rather than technology to explain
actuarial tools' proliferation. It converges with Harcourt's insight that the
pursuit of technical knowledge has shaped our notions of just punishment.
But while he anticipated that the pursuit of technical knowledge would
change us, this Article looks backward to illuminate how it already has
changed us. At the same time, it critiques the formalism of aggregative
policies in line with those critiquing the problematic turn toward the
bureaucratic episteme. 9 4 This Article suggests that we changed not only
through the orientation around prediction, but also through a technical
formalism that emerged in the 1960s and has propelled forward to shape
sentencing policy ever since. Illuminating those changes offers a new
foundation to debate risk tools now.
II. DESTABILIZING THE STANDARD NARRATIVE: FROM PAROLE
GUIDELINES TO ACTUARIAL RISK TOOLS
For the majority of the twentieth century, sentencing worked like this:
judges sentenced defendants based on the facts of the case and presentence
reports detailing the background of the offender and the nature of the crime.
Judges were constrained by legislatures who issued statutory limits on
sentences for different offenses, within which judges had to adhere. Parole
boards, however, determined the actual length of time a defendant sentenced
92. AGAINST PREDICTION, supra note 1, at 193; see also Bernard E. Harcourt, From the Ne'er-
Do- Well to the Criminal History Category: The Refinement ofthe Actuarial Model in Criminal Law, 66
L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 99, 101 (2003).
93. AGAINST PREDICTION, supra note 1, at 32-34, 186-92.
94. See, e.g., Albert W. Alschuler, The Changing Purposes of Criminal Punishment: A
Retrospective on the Past Century and Some Thoughts About the Next, 70 U. CHI. L. REv. 1 (2003);
KATE STITH & JOSt A. CABRANES, FEAR OF JUDGING: SENTENCING GUIDELINES IN THE FEDERAL
COURTS 177 (1998).
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to prison would serve based on indicators of his or her rehabilitation. This
structure is often referred to as "indeterminate" because the defendant
would not know his or her actual sentence at the time of sentencing.
Indeterminate sentencing came under attack in the 1970s. States turned
away from rehabilitation as a guiding theory of punishment simultaneous
with notable critiques of its value. 95 Law and policymakers revised
sentencing laws to shift toward a "determinate" sentencing structure.96
Under this structure, the judge sentences a defendant to a finite term of
incarceration. A defendant serves that entire term save a limited amount of
possible good credit time offered for early release. Though not all states
adopted this structure completely, many shifted in this direction and
continue to do so.
Along with the rise of determinate sentencing-but not inherently
connected to it-states and the federal government started developing and
implementing reforms derived of technical projects meant to limit and shape
the exercise of criminal justice actors' discretion at the systemic level. First
came the parole guidelines designed to rationalize the release of prisoners
under the indeterminate sentencing structure.97 Shortly thereafter states and
the federal government began developing and implementing sentencing
guidelines designed to rationalize the exercise ofjudicial discretion through
technical means, often in the context of a determinate sentencing structure.9 8
These technical projects translated into sentencing reforms. Following
intellectual historian Hunter Heyck, these reforms can be characterized as
"technosocial" because they "involved the quite deliberate reconstruction of
social relationships through technological means." 99 Critical to this
contribution, the tools produced by these projects were meant to alter
"[i]deas, practices, and behaviors" through the new technological
95. While notable critiques existed in the 1960s, see, for example, FRANCIS A. ALLEN, THE
BORDERLAND OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE (1964), it was not until 1974 that empirical studies would put the
proverbial "final nail into rehabilitation's coffin." See Cullen, supra note 24, at 300 (discussing Robert
Martinson, What Works? -Questions and Answers About Prison Reform, 35 PUB. INT. 22 (1974)).
96. See Kevin R. Reitz, The Disassembly and Reassembly of US. Sentencing Practices, in
SENTENCING AND SANCTIONS IN WESTERN COUNTRIES 222, 223 (Michael Tonry & Richard S. Frase
eds., 2001) ("[I]ndeterminate sentencing systems in many U.S. jurisdictions have given way since 1970
to an array of 'determinate' sentencing reforms.").
97. U.S. PAROLE COMM'N, HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL PAROLE SYSTEM 1 (2003); Jack M. Kress
et al., Is the End ofJudicial Sentencing in Sight, 60 JUDICATURE 216, 220 (1976). Many states curtailed
or eliminated parole altogether shortly after the introduction of parole guidelines. See infra Part II.A.
For historical context on the role of the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration in creating
technological infrastructure in criminal justice, see generally ELIZABETH HINTON, FROM THE WAR ON
POVERTY TO THE WAR ON CRIME: THE MAKING OF MASS INCARCERATION IN AMERICA 146-62 (2016).
98. See Reitz, supra note 96, at 226-27 tbl.6.1, 228 (collecting list of states adopting sentencing
guidelines and noting that many sentencing commissions calibrate sentences through a sentencing grid).
99. HEYCK, supra note 52, at 196 (explaining that such projects blended social science research
with military research techniques drawn from World War II and the Cold War).
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infrastructure that the projects produced. 00 There have been three waves of
technosocial reforms implemented to rationalize sentencing outcomes prior
to the recent rise of risk tools: clinical rehabilitation risk tools, parole
guidelines, and sentencing guidelines. The proliferation of actuarial risk
assessments as sentencing reform today can be understood as the fourth
wave of technosocial reform. The following sections describe the
introduction of various technosocial reforms with an emphasis on the role
of risk assessments before returning to the proliferation of actuarial risk
tools today.
A. The Decline ofHuman-Driven Punishment
To gain a fuller appreciation of how and why actuarial risk technologies
entered sentencing guidelines, a deeper understanding of the collapse of
rehabilitation and its relationship with technology is necessary. Prior to the
1970s, both the parole agent and the parole board worked in tandem to
release and supervise offenders in the name of rehabilitation.'o' For the
centralized administrative parole board, rehabilitation offered an important
tool for relieving prison overcrowding pressures, inducing participation in
prison programming while incarcerated, and a rhetorical justification for
offender release.1 0 2 For the parole agent, rehabilitation offered an animating
ethos and a rhetorical justification for its function. Prior to the 1950s, that
ethos was simply to reintegrate offenders into the labor market. As Jonathan
Simon indicates in Poor Discipline, the labor market offered a form of
"disciplinary control" for offenders, and parole agents largely functioned to
connect offenders with the job market before release and after.' 0 3 Boards
would hold hearings to observe offenders and search for "intuitive signs of
rehabilitation" like "repentance, willingness to accept responsibility, and
self-understanding." 04 In most states, the decision to release an offender
relied as much on the parole agent's guarantee that the offender's
100. Id.
101. A. Keith Bottomley, Parole in Transition: A Comparative Study of Origins, Developments,
and Prospects for the 1990s, 12 CRIME & JUST. 319, 321-26 (1990) (describing origin of parole in the
United States and attributing its theoretical foundation to rehabilitation).
102. Id. at 324.
103. See JONATHAN SIMON, POOR DISCIPLINE: PAROLE AND THE SOCIAL CONTROL OF THE
UNDERCLASS, 1890-1990, at 47-55 (1993) [hereinafter SIMON, POOR DISCIPLINE].
104. Project, Parole Release Decisionmaking and the Sentencing Process, 84 YALE L.J. 810, 820
(1975). As a notable exception, Illinois had developed an actuarial tool to predict recidivism risk among
inmates and inform parole board decisions. Implemented in 1932 and finessed in the decades leading up
to the 1960s, the studies used to develop this tool informed later studies to develop systemic parole
guidelines across the states. See Bernard E. Harcourt, From the Ne'er-Do- Well to the Criminal History
Category: The Refinement ofthe Actuarial Model in Criminal Law, 66 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 99, 120-
22 (2003).
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community would reintegrate the individual with a job or other
assurances. 105
Though parole was the first area of sentencing to experiment with
system-wide technosocial reform, the first wave of systemic, technical
criminal justice reform was not the creation of guidelines; it was the
expansion of the clinical model of rehabilitation in the 1950s-1960s.106
Under the clinical model, parole boards increasingly focused on assessing
an offender's likelihood of recidivism when releasing the defendant while
placing less emphasis on the agent's ability to secure community assurances
of reintegration.10 7 Though family and employment remained components
of reintegration, the clinical model's focus on the relationship between the
offender and the agent reduced the centrality of the community in the
punitive process.
There are three explanations for this shift from "disciplinary"
reintegration to "clinical" rehabilitation. First, as post-World War II
researchers shifted their attention toward the War on Poverty, they chose to
systematically focus on individual behavior rather than structural
reforms.10 8 As researchers shifted their attention toward criminal justice,
these same ideologies would influence prison policy reforms while
encouraging technical reforms. 109 Second, disappearing jobs made the
disciplinary model less feasible. Though the post-World War II era is often
characterized as an era of industrial expansion, it was marked by "slow
economic growth, frequent recessions, and the displacement of untrained
and unskilled labor through automation." '1o This trend produced a
"decoupling of the labor market for low-skilled labor from the economy as
a whole," leaving those at the bottom of the skill ladder, among whom many
were prisoners, at a disadvantage. 11 With no place to put workers at the
bottom of the hierarchy, administrators needed a new explanation for
105. SIMON,POORDISCIPLINE,supra note 103, at 59, 68.
106. While any number of reforms could be characterized as "systemic," including the
introduction of juries, I emphasize the systemic technical reforms that came about only after the idea of
criminal justice administration as a system took hold. For more on the fraught idea of system, see
Mayeux, supra note 14.
107. SIMON, POOR DISCIPLINE, supra note 103, at 68-71 (noting breakdown in the disciplinary
parole triangle of offender, community, and agent and its replacement with rehabilitation rhetoric social
science research). There were, no doubt, plenty of problems with this model of reintegration. See id. at
55-59. But the decision to change the structure altogether appears to be a response to structural changes
in society rather than simply the shortcomings of that disciplinary model. See id. at 64.
108. HINTON, supra note 97, at 49.
109. See Mayeux, supra note 14, at 66 (noting that the post-World War II and Cold War focus on
"system" would shift toward criminal justice between 1955-1975, bringing with it "the old
Enlightenment idea that human societies could be mastered and steered toward progress through the
methods of science").
110. HINTON, supra note 97, at 28.
111. SIMON, POOR DISCIPLINE, supra note 103, at 64.
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release that did not depend on society.112 Clinical rehabilitation offered that
explanation, and risk assessments bolstered the claim.
Third, the prison populations in this postwar period became increasingly
concentrated with African Americans.1 3 While explaining the cause of this
development is beyond the scope of this Article, the increasingly racialized
prison population had an effect on the policies that were implemented. The
reintegration model no longer "worked," in part because racialized
perceptions of blackness and criminality would make it more difficult to
secure jobs for the increasingly black prisoners upon release. 114 As
surveillance technologies proliferated outside the prison to focus on
behavior modifications for young people, particularly young African
Americans,' 15 they also expanded in the prison to formalize treatment and
release decisions.
So rather than simply an advance in technologies, risk tools proliferated
in prisons to "fill the rhetorical gap" as states transitioned to the "clinical"
model.11 6 Rehabilitation no longer meant connecting parolees with jobs in
the face of a shifting economic market. Instead, criminal justice
administrators shifted focus to preparing incarcerated individuals for the
possibility of jobs as part of a larger effort to improve and standardize
rehabilitative services. While laudable in the sense that the clinical model
of rehabilitation used risk tools to offer services to those who needed it, this
shift was problematic. It grew from a larger initiative to address the
sociohistorical conditions that produce crime through a one-sided approach
focused on controlling the individual's behavior rather than simultaneously
addressing social conditions in society." 7 Under the auspice of clinical
accuracy, states became more interested in adopting predictive assessment
tools to inform parole release decisions. Though Illinois had used an
actuarial risk instrument since the 1930s, by 1961 Ohio, California, and
Minnesota were developing such instruments to improve the distribution of
rehabilitative services as well. 18 Other states would soon follow. 19
112. Id. at 65-66.
113. Id. at 65.
114. See HINTON, supra note 97, at 28-29 (describing the impact of declining job prospects for
African Americans during the second half of the twentieth century).
115. Id. at 32-33.
116. See SIMON, POOR DISCIPLINE, supra note 103, at 61.
117. HINTON, supra note 97, at 31.
118. As Victor Evjen noted, "Parole prediction methods determine the chances a person has of
making a successful or unsuccessful adjustment after release from a penal institution. They are not
designed to give the optimum time for release or to portend responsiveness to supervision." Victor H.
Evjen, Current Thinking on Parole Prediction Tables, 8 CRIME & DELINQ. 215, 216 (1962); see also
AGAINST PREDICTION, supra note 1, at 70-71.
119. See AGAINST PREDICTION, supra note 1, at 77 (describing proliferation of actuarial risk tools
in the states after the 1960s).
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Ironically, the perils of automation in the private sector would prove
catalysts for the onset of automation in the administration of criminal justice.
Efforts to introduce a technical language to justify sentence outcomes would
be rehabilitation's own demise as the shoe dropped from how to rationalize
release to evaluating whether rehabilitation worked. Cultural forces would
converge with empirical studies on offender behavior (as part of the larger
effort to rationalize decisionmaking) to render rehabilitation unstable.'2 0
From academics, critiques attacking the rehabilitative model of sentencing
were ongoing since the mid-1960s.121 By the 1970s, when empirical studies
concluding that rehabilitative measures seldom change offenders' behavior
in the future bolstered these critiques, states had already started to shift away
from rehabilitation.1 2 2 When the rehabilitative ideal declined, so too did the
indeterminate sentencing structure built around it.
B. Partially Automated Sentencing Technologies
In response to these developments, the Nixon administration set out to
modernize the American correctional institutions as part of a "long-range
master plan" to improve the penal system.1 2 3 Alongside efforts to build
prisons, the administration would finance technical projects that set the
foundation for system-wide parole guidelines. As the following subsections
explain, the construction and implementation of parole guidelines would
fuel the creation of the second technology introduced at sentencing-
sentencing guidelines. The actuarial risk tools proliferating at sentencing
now build from these technologies, but differ in important respects that will
be addressed as well.
1. Parole Guidelines
The United States Board of Parole implemented the first set of guidelines
to standardize prison release around risk and crime seventy while
eliminating the role of rehabilitation.1 24 Specialists focused on structuring
criminal justice decisionmaking and empirical research techniques came
120. Cf Michael Tonry, Obsolescence and Immanence in Penal Theory and Policy, 105 COLUM.
L. REV. 1233 (2005) [hereinafter Tonry, Obsolescence] (noting the instability of rehabilitation started in
the late 1950s).
121. See, e.g., ALLEN, supra note 95.
122. See Martinson, supra note 95; DOUGLAS LIPTON, ROBERT MARTINSON & JUDITH WILKS,
THE EFFECTIVENESS OF CORRECTIONAL TREATMENT: A SURVEY OF TREATMENT EVALUATION
STUDIES (1975).
123. HINTON, supra note 97, at 163 -64.
124. See Bottomley, supra note 101, at 344.
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together to develop the parole guidelines. 125 Those guidelines generated
from initial research for a pilot reorganization program started in 1972.126
Funded by the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, a federal
agency developed to create and expand system control in criminal justice
reforms, the U.S. Parole Board implemented the guidelines across the
country in 1974.127 In 1976, Congress legislatively mandated consideration
of those guidelines in the parole release process. 12 8
The parole guidelines represented a quintessential technosocial
innovation. It was a tool designed to standardize sentencing outcomes by
partially mechanizing parole release based on studies that would largely
quantify components of the decisionmaking process.1 2 9 Through the tool,
infrastructure and parole board control were enhanced. The guidelines
blended technical expertise and policy rationales in order to both facilitate
the production of parole policy and enforce that policy among individual
board actors.
The Parole Guidelines relied on a two-dimensional decision matrix based
on offense seriousness and a "Salient Factor Score" indicating the prisoner's
statistical likelihood of reoffending. 13 0 The Salient Factor Score was an
eleven-point actuarial measurement designed to categorize prisoners into
one of four risk categories based on his or her likelihood of reoffending.13 1
125. For example, Dr. Don Gottfredson, then Director of the National Council on Crime and
Delinquency Research Center, was co-director of the study on parole decisionmaking. U.S. PAROLE
COMM'N, supra note 97, at 17. He demonstrated a particular interest in "the application of scientific
methods to problems of crime and justice" and particularly to efforts to structure decisionmaking. See,
e.g., Don M. Gottfredson, Prediction and Classification in Criminal Justice Decision Making, 9 Crime
& Just. 1, 1 (1987). Dr. Peter Hoffman joined the project as the parole board's Director of Research in
1972 with a focus on empirical methods. U.S. PAROLE COMM'N, supra note 97, at 19. Hoffman played
an outsize role in development of the actuarial risk assessment incorporated into the parole guidelines.
See infra notes 133-35 and accompanying text.
126. For a description of the project, see DON M. GOTTFREDSON ET AL., THE UTILIZATION OF
EXPERIENCE IN PAROLE DECISION-MAKING: SUMMARY REPORT (1974).
127. 28 C.F.R. §§ 2.1-2.58 (1976); see also Peter B. Hoffman & Barbara Stone-Meierhoefer,
Application of Guidelines to Sentencing, 3 L. & PSCYHOL. REV. 53, 63 (1977).
128. Parole Commission and Reorganization Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-233, 90 Stat. 219
(repealed 1984) (establishing the Parole Commission and mandating parole guidelines, written
explanations of parole denial, and an administrative appeal process).
129. See HEYCK, supra note 52, at 196 (technosocial projects were "intended to produce systems,
infrastructures, and institutions" while reconstructing social relationships between people); see also
Mayeux, supra note 14 (describing features of systems thinking that would merge into criminal justice
after 1967).
130. Bottomley, supra note 101, at 344.
131. Don M. Gottfredson et al., Making Paroling Policy Explicit, 21 CRIME & DELINQ. 34, 38
(1975) (Salient Factor Score produced four categories of risk: very good, good, fair, and poor); see also
Peter B. Hoffman & Lucille K. DeGostin, Parole Decision-Making: Structuring Discretion, 38 FED.
PROBATION 7, 15 (1974) (illustrating eleven-point assessment based on nine elements). Revised several
times after initial implementation, the tool increasingly reduced the factors included as a means to ensure
fairness. So while the tool initially included factors on criminal history, drug dependence, education,
employment, and family status, see Tonry, Issues, supra note 74, at 168, it eliminated some variables
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At the intersection of the axes of crime severity and the Salient Factor Score,
the guidelines offered a range of months within which the offender could
expect release. Board examiners were directed to provide explanations for
any divergence from the standard range indicated by the guidelines.1 3 2
Notably, the guidelines excluded reference to rehabilitation while
amplifying the role of recidivism risk. There are three explanations for this
absence, each blending the critique of rehabilitation with the promise of
technology. First, Dr. Peter Hoffman, a key technical advisor on the parole
guideline project, developed substantial research independent of this project
searching for a proper parole policy feedback "measure" or "device." 3 3 His
research converged on "parole risk" and asserted that this prediction of
possible parole violation was, for all measurable purposes, the same as
rehabilitation.' 34 Drawing from his own previous criminological research,
he determined that rehabilitation and recidivism risk were coterminous-
three decisions about what matters at parole reduced to one: institutional
program participation, correctional discipline, and risk of parole
violation.'
As a second rationale, the move toward risk was driven by the political
critiques against rehabilitation. As the Parole Project explained in 1975,
"The [U.S. Parole Board] has quite properly abandoned the search for the
'magic moment' for release based on rehabilitation that characterized parole
release decisionmaking for 20 years." 136 Relying on the language of
empirical research, the Parole Project affirmed a political trend that had
already taken form.1 37 It solidified the turn away from rehabilitation by
noting that "[e]xtensive social science research strongly suggests that
rehabilitation-defined as an increasing likelihood of successful adjustment
upon release-cannot be observed, detected or measured."'3 8 In response,
over time. See AGAINST PREDICTION, supra note 1, at 70-71 (describing the methodological
underpinnings of the Salient Factor Score).
132. Gottfredson et al., supra note 131, at 40-43 (describing parole guidelines pilot project
implementation and listing indications of guideline divergence); see also 28 C.F.R. § 2.20(c) (1976)
(implementing parole guidelines nationally).
133. Peter B. Hoffman, Paroling Policy Feedback, 9 J. RES. CRIME & DELINQ. 117, 117-18
(1972).
134. See id. at 124 (noting "[s]trong correlations" among institutional progress, discipline, and
parole risk).
135. Hoffman also studied a fourth factor-the severity of the present offense. Because that factor
remains an independent component at sentencing, it is not referenced in the above text. See id at 121.
136. Project, supra note 104, at 826-27.
137. See Tonry, Obsolescence, supra note 120, at 1252 (noting that faith in the rehabilitative ideal
declined far earlier than 1974); see also Cullen, supra note 24, at 326-28.
138. Project, supra note 104, at 826-27.
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the commission literally recast rehabilitation as risk when it translated
"parole prognosis" into the assessment of recidivism risk. 3 9
Third, the turn away from rehabilitation was animated by racialized
assumptions in two ways. There were unfounded assumptions about which
prisoners could be rehabilitated as the prison population became majority
minority.1 40 There were assumptions about the source of racial disparities as
well. Policymakers in the 1970s converged on the threat of arbitrary
exercise of an individual judge's discretion as the locus of concern in
sentencing reform. 141 They largely turned a blind eye to the structural
changes in policing practices and sentencing policies as the source of
increasing disparities.1 4 2 Because parole guidelines were developed in part
to ameliorate disparities at sentencing,1 4 3 advocates put forth recidivism risk
as a promising method to standardize sentencing outcomes without
addressing front-end policies.1 4 4
Once again, the rise of risk technologies was not the product of its
empirical value, but sentencing did change to accommodate technology. In
response to characterizations about society and a desire to find an abstract
solution to social problems, risk tools proliferated. In the wake of parole
guidelines implementation, the structure of parole remained, but the guiding
theory justifying its existence did not. In its place, parole boards
implemented what had been a largely off-purpose use of the tools. Whereas
actuarial risk tools were "not designed to give the optimum time for release"
in the 1960s, by the 1970s that is exactly how the tools were used.1 4 5
Parole guidelines would quickly expand across the states throughout the
1970s and 1980S.146 Many states would adopt actuarial risk tools as part of
139. See Gottfredson et al., supra note 131, at 37. Notably, the technical advisors constructing the
Salient Factor Score drew on methodologies to predict risk present since the 1930s in Illinois. See
AGAINST PREDICTION, supra note 1, at 70-71.
140. HINTON, supra note 97, at 169 (attributing the modernization of prisons and prison release
programs to the increasingly majority minority prison populations and "the view of national officials
and policymakers" who believed that "this 'new class of inmates' . . . were incapable of responding to
rehabilitative attempts"); FRANCIS A. ALLEN, THE DECLINE OF THE REHABILITATIVE IDEAL: PENAL
POLICY AND SOCIAL PURPOSE 30-31 (1981) (noting that rehabilitation declined with the rising non-
white prison population).
141. See, e.g., AM. FRIENDS SERV. COMM., STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE: A REPORT ON CRIME AND
PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA 107-12 (1971); KENNETH CULP DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A
PRELIMINARY INQUIRY (1969).
142. See, e.g., Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., The Death ofDiscretion? Reflections on the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1938, 1958 & n.1 19 (1988) (warning that racial disparities
will persist in noncapital sentencing if mitigating factors are not taken into consideration and urging
reforms that address structural problems like criminal history).
143. Bottomley, supra note 101, at 337-38.
144. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., The Repressed Issues of Sentencing: Accountability,
Predictability, and Equality in the Era of the Sentencing Commission, 66 GEO. L.J. 975, 1005 (1978).
145. See Evjen, supra note 118, at 216.
146. Bottomley, supra note 101, at 344.
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their release process as well.1 47 Others would curtail or eliminate parole
altogether. 148 At the same time, federal agencies would fund technical
projects that shifted focus from parole to sentencing.1 4 9 In the wake of the
parole guidelines' "success," sentencing guidelines to limit and control
judicial sentencing discretion would emerge.150
2. Sentencing Guidelines
Sentencing guidelines, like parole guidelines before them, were explicit
technosocial reforms meant to standardize sentencing outcomes.' 5 ' Driven
by the political desire to make sentencing more accountable, rational, and
transparent 52 and acting in the name of uniformity, almost half the states
and the federal government created sentencing commissions or legislative
committees at one time or another to develop mandatory or voluntary
guidelines with technical assistance.' 5 3 While parole guidelines applied to
parole boards, sentencing guidelines were developed to constrain judicial
discretion directly. 15 4 Those guidelines would mirror technical form to the
parole guidelines, including a role for recidivism risk.
147. See SIMON, POOR DISCIPLINE, supra note 103, at 169 (detailing orientation around risk);
AGAINST PREDICTION, supra note 1, at 9 fig. 1.1 (documenting the rise of actuarial prediction instruments
in parole).
148. Bottomley, supra note 101, at 341-47.
149. See, e.g., Kress et al., supra note 97, at 216 n.l (noting funding support from the LEAA);
HINTON, supra note 97, at 163-75 (detailing the connection between LEAA funding initiatives and
correctional policy reforms).
150. See Kress et al., supra note 97, at 220 (characterizing the parole guideline development as
"successful").
151. Current guideline states include Alabama, Arkansas, Delaware, District of Columbia, Florida,
Kansas, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania,
Tennessee, Utah, Virginia, Washington, and the Federal system. Rachel E. Barkow, Sentencing
Guidelines at the Crossroads of Politics and Expertise, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1599, 1600 (2012);
Sentencing Guidelines Resource Center: In-Depth Jurisdiction Profiles, ROBINA INST. CRIM. L. &CRIM.
JUST., https://sentencing.umn.edu/profiles/alabama (last updated Aug. 23, 2019). In addition, there are
states that have developed guidelines but the legislature did not ratify them. In states like Massachusetts,
courts commonly use them anyway. See Massachusetts Guidelines Jurisdiction, ROBINA INST. CRIM. L.
& CRIM. JUST., https://sentencing.umn.edu/profiles/massachusetts [https://perma.cc/7LCL-E4NU] (last
updated Mar. 26, 2018).
152. For the paradigmatic advance of these concepts in sentencing, see generally MARVIN E.
FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES: LAW WITHOUT ORDER 7 (1973) (calling for "consistency," "ordered
rationality," and "standards" in sentencing).
153. Of course, efforts to reduce disparities in sentencing existed before Judge Frankel's call to
arms in 1973. See, e.g., Shari Seidman Diamond & Hans Zeisel, Sentencing Councils: A Study of
Sentence Disparity and its Reduction, 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 109, 116-18 (1975). Moreover, the call for
systemic regulation of discretion in the criminal justice system also existed before Judge Frankel's call
for reform. See, e.g., DAVIS, supra note 141. Yet Judge Frankel's precise critiques of "lawless sentencing"
are largely considered the "brainchild" of what we now understand as the sentencing guidelines,
particularly in the federal system.
154. Virginia was, to start, an outlier in its advisory rather than mandatory nature. Only after the
Supreme Court's decisions in Blakely v. Washington (2004) and United States v. Booker (2005) were
guidelines across the states recharacterized as advisory rather than mandatory. See John F. Pfaff, The
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Sentencing guidelines sought to structure judicial decisionmaking
around two factors: crime severity and offender characteristics.' In fact,
the same technicians who developed the parole guidelines influenced or
constructed leading sentencing guidelines. 15 6 The underlying studies that
produced their frameworks also originated from projects funded by the Law
Enforcement Assistance Administration.157 Dr. Peter Hoffman served as a
technical advisor on several of the leading sentencing commissions creating
guidelines, including Minnesota and Washington State during his time as a
Director of Research at the U.S. Parole Commission. 158 In particular, he
advocated for and replicated the two-dimensional structure now prevalent
in most guideline systems. Hoffman, a primary developer of the Salient Risk
Factor tool in the parole guidelines, would bring the biaxial framework to
the state guideline systems. To the federal guidelines, he brought the
actuarial risk assessment technique as well when he served as the Principal
Technical Advisor and primary drafter in constructing the federal
sentencing guidelines.159
Yet sentencing guidelines and parole guidelines differed in an important
respect pertaining to recidivism risk. While the structure of the guidelines
was the same, the parole guidelines considered the Salient Risk Factor Score
in the same location that the sentencing guidelines considered criminal
history categores.160 Thus, a clear connection existed between the criminal
Continued Vitality of Structured Sentencing Following Blakely: The Effectiveness of Voluntary
Guidelines, 54 UCLA L. REV. 235, 237 (2006). Adherence to the guidelines (and notably the federal
guidelines) remained largely the same before and after the guidelines were rendered advisory. For
example, judicial adherence to the federal guidelines hovers somewhere around 80 percent if you include
prosecutorial motions to divert from the guidelines in the metric of departure. See U.S. SENTENCING
COMM'N, SENTENCES RELATIVE TO THE GUIDELINE RANGE OVER TIME (2006-2017), https://isb.ussc.g
ov/api/repos/:USSC: figurexx.xcdf/generatedContent?&tablenum=FigureT4. The Supreme Court
continues to struggle with the meaning of advisory versus mandatory sentencing guidelines. See, e.g.,
Beckles v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 886 (2017).
155. See MICHAEL TONRY, SENTENCING MATTERS 10 (1996).
156. Kress et al., supra note 97, at 220 (describing their sentencing guideline research project,
which "grew out of the successful completion of a decision-making study which developed guidelines
for the United States Board of Parole").
157. Id.
158. See Coffee, supra note 144, at 1005; see also Brent E. Newton & Dawinder S. Sidhu, The
History of the Original United States Sentencing Commission, 1985-1987, 45 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1167,
1195, 1288 (2017) (emphasizing Hoffman's role in federal sentencing guidelines construction as pinch
hitter in late stage construction, along with involvement in Minnesota).
159. See Newton & Sidhu, supra note 158, at 1195, 1288 (following the advice ofHoffman, the
U.S. Sentencing Commission modeled criminal history categories "more on the federal parole guidelines
-in particular, its Salient Factor Score ("SFS"}-than on criminal history provisions of the state
guidelines").
160. Most guidelines offer a criminal history score based on points accumulated from prior
engagement with the criminal justice system. In this sense, state guidelines are deeply influenced by the
Salient Risk Score used in the U.S. parole guidelines described above. For discussion of variety, see
RICHARD S. FRASE ET AL., ROBINA INST. CRIM. L. & CRIM. JUST., CRIMINAL HISTORY ENHANCEMENTS
SOURCEBOOK (2015).
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history categories and recidivism risk for technical guideline developers
from the start.
Criminal justice actors, however, converged on criminal history as the
primary mechanism to calculate offender characteristics in sentencing
guidelines. For example, Pennsylvania's Sentencing Commission
converged on the offender's criminal history as the measure of
criminality. 161 Minnesota would similarly converge on criminal history
factors in place of the Salient Factor Score. 162 By the time the U.S.
Sentencing Commission sought comments for its sentencing guidelines in
1986, commentators treated criminal history as the obvious and key factor
to account for defendants' differences.1 6 3 Even states that did not adopt
sentencing guidelines but changed their sentencing statutes used the
language of risk but only identified factors related to criminal history.16 4
State and federal actors explicitly rejected additional risk factors used by
technical developers as a means to consider criminality at sentencing. For
example, while technical assessments of risk included factors like age and
employment status, risk assessments incorporated into sentencing
guidelines did not.1 6 5
There are two reasons for this convergence on criminal history rather
than broader predictive risk factors. First, law and policymakers sought to
avoid philosophical conflict. With the turn away from rehabilitation,
lawmakers sought to avoid a contentious divide between those adhering to
a retributive orientation and those adhering to consequentialist concerns.166
Converging on criminal history as the offender characteristic offered an
ambiguous method to do both.1 6 7 Criminal history was accorded a natural
legitimacy at sentencing even if for undefined reasons.1 6 8 Second, social
161. See Lynch & Bertenthal, supra note 75, at 151 (referencing letters from PA Commissioner
to Commissioner Block).
162. ANDREW VON HIRSCH, PAST OR FUTURE CRIMES: DESERVEDNESS AND DANGEROUSNESS IN
THE SENTENCING OF CRIMINALS 134-37 (1985).
163. See Lynch & Bertenthal, supra note 75, at 151 (referencing letters from PA Commissioner
to Commissioner Block).
164. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.12(D)-(E) (West 1973) (urging courts to consider
"risk that the offender will commit another offense and the need for public protection").
165. See Tonry, Issues, supra note 74, at 168 (displaying chart with distinctions between risk
factors used in criminal justice contexts over time).
166. The turn toward retribution was in part a turn away from risk. See, e.g., JOHN KLEINIG,
PUNISHMENT AND DESERT (1973); ANDREW VON HIRSCH, DOING JUSTICE: THE CHOICE OF
PUNISHMENTS: REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE FOR THE STUDY OF INCARCERATION (1976); VON HIRSCH,
supra note 162, at 22-23, 131 (focusing on the "in-out" line on sentencing guidelines to demonstrate
desert versus incapacitation theories of construction). Utilitarians ultimately converged on risk after
some division on deterrence. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (1975);
JAMES Q. WILSON, THINKING ABOUT CRIME (rev. ed. 1983).
167. See, e.g., U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, GUIDELINES MANUAL § IA1.1 (2004).
168. See, e.g., Benjamin Ewing, Prior Convictions as Moral Opportunities, 45 AM. J. CRIM. L.
253 (2019).
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justice concerns justified reliance on criminal history. While some were
concerned that criminal history itself would institutionalize race and class
into the guidelines, there was clear awareness that including any other risk
factors was destined to do so.169 Thus criminal history emerged as the
objective factor in line with human values.
In short, policymakers developing sentencing guidelines were
confronted with a choice about whether and how to consider actuarial risk
assessments. Though some commissions took empirical literature into
account in developing their criminal history categories,' 7 0 the decision to
converge on criminal history rather than simply recidivism risk was to a
greater extent an attempt to make technology heel to human values reflected
at sentencing.' 7 ' To be sure, the orientation around risk was driven at least
in part by technical path dependence from predecessor technologies
influenced by WWII and Cold War experts. 172 But realism and human
values combined to serve as a limit on the expansion of that technology at
sentencing. Accordingly, states used factors related to criminal history as
the basis to individualize standardized sentencing ranges in the technical
guidelines.
C. Actuarial Tools Revisited
As noted above, states are again building technological infrastructure at
sentencing. Today's risk tools are at once the continuation of a path and a
divergence from it. Instead of making the tools fit into sentencing,
sentencing is now adjusting to fit the tools.
In part, this may have occurred because law and policymakers made risk
central to sentencing policy in the 1980s and 1990s. As technical reforms
proliferated across the states, law and policymakers reshaped sentencing
law and policies around actuarial techniques. While three strikes laws are
169. See, e.g., Lynch & Bertenthal, supra note 75, at 150-51.
170. See AGAINST PREDICTION, supra note I (detailing the empirical literature converging on
criminal history as the primary predictor in risk tools leading up to the 1970s).
171. As a further example, over time states adopted "decay" provisions that limit the time within
which a prior crime can count towards the current sentence range. See, e.g., Julian V. Roberts & Orhun
H. Yalincak, Revisiting Prior Record Enhancement Provisions in State Sentencing Guidelines, 26 FED.
SENT'G REP. 177 (2014); Dawinder S. Sidhu, Moneyball Sentencing, 56 B.C. L. REV. 671, 723 (2015)
(introducing limits to federal sentencing guidelines).
172. Alfred Blumstein, An OR Missionary's Visits to the Criminal Justice System, 55 OPERATIONS
RES. 14, 15 (2007) ("Even though the issue of recidivism has always been of central interest to both
criminologists and practitioners, . . . key features that were provoked by the feedback model[ constructed
in the development of technosocial reforms]-in particular, the distinctions between recidivists and first-
timers and the time lags involved in recidivism-had not previously been explored." (emphasis added)).
For more discussion, see Newton & Sidhu, supra note 158, at 1289-90 (crediting federal criminal history
construction to Peter Hoffman almost exclusively); see also Hoffman & Stone-Meierhoefer, supra note
127, at 63 (advocating for application of the biaxial parole guidelines to sentencing guidelines).
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the most notable example, states and the federal government expanded a
variety of recidivist enhancements in statutes and in their guidelines to
increase a defendant's sentence as a crude predictor of recidivism.' 73 In
essence, the more states cared about criminal risk, the more susceptible to
consideration of actuarial risk technologies we would become.
This Article suggests a richer account is necessary to explain this
transition. The standard narrative sustains an exclusive focus on the
technical changes achieved over time. It obscures the social changes. Yet
this brief history of predecessor sentencing technologies offers two
important insights that undermine this narrative. First, technical reforms
were meant to shape the social. That is the nature of the "technosocial." In
the beginning, the social did shape the technical. Part I demonstrates that
today, there has been a pivotal switch obscured by the standard narrative.
Second, this history begs an open question: what are those social
transformations spurred by the introduction of technology itself?
Furthermore, how do those transformations sustain actuarial risk tools'
advance as sentencing reform now?
Here is where a counternarrative is necessary. Right now, there is no
language to describe this shift in focus. Through the standard narrative it
appears logical and consistent with human values. But the pursuit of
technological advancement in sentencing is not a foregone conclusion.
More to the point, it is not costless. Technological reforms induce long-
lasting effects on society that shape our sensibilities over time. It reduces
our ability to articulate objection to tool advance that evade quantification
because technology literally claims our words. The following Part shows
how. In so doing, it gives substance to sentencing's technological
counternarrative. Specifically, it illuminates the reality that technology
distorts the social concepts that shape our human interactions, and not
because our human values evolve.
Before identifying and analyzing shifting social concepts, it is important
to explain what does not generate this transformation. It is not technological
advancement for its own sake. As this novel history illuminates, the
technology may be advancing but it can only expand where the social
conditions are right. Indeed, advocates suggest as much when they draw
upon the history of the tools. More importantly, the catalyst of social
transformation is not mass incarceration. This sociohistorical phenomenon
provides context for improving carceral processes. It is not a reason to
change social ideas that shape punishment. Those ideas have already
changed, and our responses illuminate how. Said differently, the social and
173. See, e.g., U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4A1.1 (2018); WASH. REV.
CODE § 9.94A.010 (1999); see generally AGAINST PREDICTION, supra note 1, at 91-103 (detailing
proliferation of criminal history-based sentencing enhancements modeled on the actuarial paradigm).
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economic pressures of mass incarceration may provoke us to implement
change, but the crisis itself does not show us how to do it. Human values
drive that transformation. And it is in those human values-what we think
we are doing-that we can see how technology altered our social concepts.
At the intersection of rhetoric and reform, our choices glean insight to
technologically-induced mutations that have already occurred.
III. ILLUMINATING THE COUNTERNARRATIVE: MUTATING SOCIAL
CONCEPTS AROUND TECHNOLOGIES
This Part builds from the technical history in Part II to lay out a
counternarrative to the advancement of risk tools now. It locates the rise of
risk tools in three social transformations that have occurred through or
alongside the proliferation of sentencing technologies that make statistically
robust actuarial risk tools acceptable as sentencing reform. Part A considers
how rehabilitation, one of the theoretical justifications of punishment, has
altered to more closely reflect incapacitation through the pursuit of technical
knowledge. Part B considers how "racial justice" distributed through a focus
on technical guideline uniformity reified structural racism while deifying
technical formalism. Part C traces the convergence of dangerousness and
risk in social meaning. Each of these social transformations facilitates the
proliferation of actuarial risk tools not because the technology advances, but
because technology changed society.
A. "Rehabilitation" and the Theoretical Obfuscation ofIncapacitation
The first transformation concerns the meaning of "rehabilitation." As
noted above, risk tools are central to the demise of rehabilitation. As this
Part highlights, the tools are critical to its recent resurgence as well.
Obscured in this "pendulum swing" is the fundamental transformation of
rehabilitation's meaning, the central role that technology played in altering
that social concept, and its connection to the proliferation of risk tools today
without resistance. In other words, technology changed rehabilitation, and
not because our human or political values altered.
With the demise of rehabilitation, no single theory emerged to animate
sentencing reforms. Scholars largely converged on variations of retribution.
In practice, however, the driving theory appeared to be some version of
incapacitation, meaning the removal of an offender's ability to commit
future crime. 7 4 While incapacitation has long been a theory of punishment,
it would ascend with the introduction of risk technologies and the expansion
174. See, e.g., Kevin Bennardo, Incarceration 's Incapacitative Shortcomings, 54 SANTA CLARA
L. REv. 1, 2 (2014).
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of the carceral state. By 1982, the controversial theory of "selective
incapacitation" would emerge in public policy and scholarly circles. 175 The
brainchild of military-research outpost RAND Corporation, this version of
incapacitation seeks to identify high-risk defendants through an actuarial
risk tool for long prison sentences in order to save costs and reduce crime.1 7 6
But rather than selectively incapacitating the few offenders that posed a
threat of dangerousness, states converged on "total incapacitation" by
incarcerating large swaths of the population. 1 77 Though a highly criticized
theory due to its limitless bounds, the expansive theory of incapacitation
through incarceration proved a popular approach to addressing both crime
and social ills.
Risk becomes a critical component of incapacitation because the threat
of future criminal behavior legitimates the state's punitive intervention. In
recent years, however, the expansion of statistically robust actuarial tools at
sentencing has been legitimated on an alternative ground- rehabilitation.
Rehabilitation justifies punishment as a means to reform wrongdoers so that
they will not choose to engage in crime in the future. 17 8 As Judge Roger
Warren explained in 2009, using risk tools at sentencing promotes "public
safety through 'recidivism reduction."' 179 Though he suggested that
"'rehabilitation' terminology" does not fully capture this aim, he
acknowledged that the approach generated from this theory. Iso Justice
William Ray Price, Jr., in 2010, emphasized that consideration of risk tools
allows the judge to "assess[] each offender's risk and then fit[] that offender
with the cheapest and most effective rehabilitation that he or she needs."' 8 '
Similarly, the National Center for State Courts endorsed the use of risk tools
for sentencing decisions that are in essence correctional because the tools
175. See, e.g., Note, Selective Incapacitation: Reducing Crime Through Predictions ofRecidivism,
96 HARV. L. REV. 511 (1982); MARK H. MOORE ET AL., DANGEROUS OFFENDERS: THE ELUSIVE
TARGET OF JUSTICE (1984).
176. RAND Corporation proposed selective incapacitation as a "coherent scheme" at sentencing
in 1982. See PETER W. GREENWOOD & ALLAN ABRAHAMSE, RAND CORP., SELECTIVE INCAPACITATION
(1982). Researchers surmised that strategically identifying and incapacitating the select individuals
believed to be responsible for a disproportionate share of crime could reduce crime without significantly
increasing correctional costs. Id. The study offered an actuarially derived seven-factor predictive scale
that would identify these select individuals for long-term confinement. Id.
177. See Jonathan Simon, The Second Coming of Dignity, in THE NEW CRIMINAL JUSTICE
THINKING 275, 299 (Sharon Dolovich & Alexandra Natapoff eds., 2017); see also JONATHAN SIMON,
MASS INCARCERATION ON TRIAL: A REMARKABLE COURT DECISION AND THE FUTURE OF PRISONS IN
AMERICA 17-44 (2014).
178. See MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 6.02A cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 2017).
179. Roger K. Warren, Evidence-Based Sentencing in the State Courts, 27 FED. SENT'G REP. 248,
251 (2015).
180. Id. at 250-51.
181. Hon. William Ray Price, Jr., Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Mo., State of the Judiciary
Address (Feb. 3, 2010), https://www.courts.mo.gov/page.jsp?id=36875 [https://perma.cc/UC6H-W8L
W].
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can encourage judicial focus on rehabilitative efforts.1 82 To be sure, many
recognize that the tools ensure treatment or surveillance that can also hold
defendants accountable,183 yet the association with rehabilitation is there.1 8 4
This shift in association is understandable, but only because the
introduction of risk technologies had the effect of changing rehabilitation.
When the parole board simplified rehabilitation into a "risk," "' the
conceptual change stuck. When Robert Martinson and others critiqued
rehabilitation on the basis of its empirical efficacy,1 8 6 it had a lasting effect
on the idea of rehabilitation as well. As Francis Cullen explains, "It
transformed the debate on rehabilitation from a broad and complex critique
of the welfare state into the narrower and simpler issue of effectiveness." 87
Most rehabilitation scholars responded to the "nothing works" critiques by
focusing on program effectiveness. 188 If rehabilitation declined in part
because it could not be standardized and proven effective as a technical
matter, these scholars committed themselves to rehabilitating rehabilitation
by proving its effect on risk. In other words, they saved rehabilitation by
making the technical assessment of risk central to the theory.
This transformation is wrapped up in the narrative of technological
advancement. Pervasive genealogies of actuarial risk tools emphasize the
promise of this evolution in risk technologies toward risk and needs
responsivity.1 89 The "new" tools are not like the "old" tools designed to
further selective incapacitation because they identify specific and general
risk levels, along with specific interventions.' 9 0 As rehabilitation scholar
Don Andrews notes, "past (type 2) assessments of risk fail to prescribe
interventions, and ignore the fact that, once in the correctional system,
182. CTR. FOR SENTENCING INITIATIVES, supra note 29.
183. Id.; see also Warren, supra note 179, at 250.
184. See Collins, Punishing Risk, supra note 29, at 73-74, 85-91 (emphasizing that "off label"
use of popular risk tools at sentencing is encouraged because of its association with rehabilitation).
185. See supra notes 136-39 and accompanying text.
186. Martinson, supra note 95, at 25 (concluding that "[w]ith few and isolated exceptions, the
rehabilitative efforts ... have had no appreciable effect on recidivism").
187. Cullen, supra note 24, at 329.
188. Id. at 335-45 (referencing the seminal research of Paul Gendreau, Donald Andrews, James
Bonta, and others). Cullen, on the other hand, argued to maintain rehabilitation for its systemwide
benefits. See id.
189. See id at 335-45 (detailing emergence of the risk and needs approach); see also supra note
65.
190. There are about four "generations" of risk tools. Hannah-Moffat, Punishment, supra note 56,
at 132-36. The first generation refers to clinical assessments, meaning those done by persons based on
experience. Id. at 132-33. The second refers to those standardized assessments meant to predict
likelihood of recidivism based on static factors. Id. at 133-34. The third predicts risk based on static and
dynamic factors, including those behavior factors that can be changed. Id. at 135. The line between the
third and fourth generation is a bit murky, but fourth generation tools are meant to identify specific needs
to respond to the mutable characteristics that render some defendants at higher risk of recidivism. Id. at
136.
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offenders are subject to events and experiences that may produce shifts in
their chances of recidivism."l 9' Accordingly, these scholars pushed beyond
criminal history as a predictor of risk to include changeable factors referred
to as needs.19 2
In short, rehabilitation transformed to accommodate the pursuit of
technical knowledge.1 9 3 In the process, risk technologies were increasingly
insulated from critique because of their association with rehabilitation.' 94
The history of actuarial risk tools' evolution is the social history of risk
being disassociated with incapacitation and written within the narrative of
technological advancement. Indeed, most developers reference the seminal
work of rehabilitation scholars when constructing actuarial risk tools.' 95 In
this sense, the risk technologies proliferating today are aligned with various
correctional intervention technologies.1 96 But that is not because the tools
inherently reflect rehabilitation; rather, it is because rehabilitation came to
reflect risk technologies.
Contrary to the standard narrative of technological advancement, the
benefit of this transformation is debatable, particularly as this mutation
expands from corrections to sentencing. Advocates suggest expanding the
consideration of risk is a pragmatic reform central to being "smart on
crime."' 97 They applaud states for being "selective and cautious" rather than
"starry-eyed and egalitarian" in the pursuit of criminal justice reform.1 98
In the context of sentencing rather than corrections, however, the
expansion of actuarial risk tools rings of selective incapacitation.' 99 As I
have explained elsewhere, selective incapacitation and neorehabilitation
exist along the same theoretical spectrum, only with a different rhetoric
bolstering its advance. Neorehabilitation uses the idea of selective
incapacitation to reframe incapacitative interventions for low-risk
defendants as rehabilitative programming justified on the basis of its ability
19 1. Hannah-Moffat, Punishment, supra note 56, at 135 (quoting D. A. Andrews, Recidivism Is
Predictable and Can Be Influenced, I F. ON CORRECTIONS RES. I1, I 1-17 (1989)); see also D. A.
Andrews et al., Classification for Effective Rehabilitation, 17 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 19 (1990).
192. Hannah-Moffat, Punishment, supra note 56, at 135-37.
193. See Cullen, supra note 24, at 329 (noting that critiques of rehabilitation's ineffectiveness
"unwittingly gave advocates of rehabilitation a strategy for turning a losing battle into a winning war").
194. See, e.g., Melissa Hamilton, Risk-Needs Assessment: Constitutional and Ethical Challenges,
52 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 231, 242 61 (2015) (noting that to constitutionally attack risk tools one must
critique rehabilitation).
195. See Klingele, supra note 20; see also Eaglin, Constructing, supra note 12.
196. Cf Collins, Punishing Risk, supra note 29 (critiquing the use of risk tools designed for
correctional purposes in the sentencing context).
197. Mary D. Fan, Beyond Budget-Cut Criminal Justice: The Future of Penal Law, 90 N.C. L.
REV. 581, 635 (2012).
198. Id. at 586, 637.
199. See Eaglin, Against Neorehabilitation, supra note 5, at 222-23.
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to reduce crime and reduce correctional costs. 2 0 0 While these management
techniques may seem to have some basis in rehabilitating some offenders,
the animating ethos of the reform is not the egalitarian aim of traditional
rehabilitative interventions of yore, which sought to improve the lives of the
defendants processed through the criminal justice apparatus for their sake
alone. Instead the ethos lies in the efficient management of groups of people
and effectiveness of the carceral state itself.201
In practice, blurring this line between rehabilitation and incapacitation
may legitimate expanding criminal justice surveillance while also
expanding the reach of the criminal justice system. For example,
introducing actuarial risk assessments may encourage judges to impose
some form of supervision for defendants that would otherwise have been
diverted with little or none.202 At the same time, risk tools may encourage
judges to impose longer sentences or more onerous surveillance
mechanisms for high-risk defendants that prove disintegrative socially and
economically.203 The introduction of electronic monitoring devices has
operated in just this manner.204 Yet because the courts or policymakers
perceive the interventions as benevolent responses to recidivism risk-
200. See id. at 222-24 (defining neorehabilitation as the dominant framework for sentencing
reforms adopted in response to mass incarceration); see also Erin R. Collins, Status Courts, 105 GEO.
L.J. 1481, 1499-1500 (2017); Eric J. Miller, Drugs, Courts, and the New Penology, 20 STAN. L. & POL'Y
REV. 417, 441 (2009) (critiquing neorehabilitation in context of drug courts).
201. Eaglin, Against Neorehabilitation, supra note 5, at 199-201.
202. This scenario could arise, for example, where an individual characterized as low-risk is
subjected to multiple low-visibility criminal justice interventions that can ultimately be more onerous
for reintegration than a short stint of incarceration. For examples of low-visibility criminal justice
interventions intersecting with risk assessments, see GARRETT ET AL., supra note 42, at 8 tbl.2
(identifying various alternative sanctions like electronic monitoring, jailing, and community service
available for defendants identified as "low risk" in Virginia). For further explanation of the disintegrative
nature of excessive supervision conditions, see, for example, Eaglin, Paradigm, supra note 15, at 631-
32.
203. See Starr, Rationalization, supra note 25, at 867-70 (discussing experimental study of
students exposed to risk assessments where sentences increase for defendants categorized as high risk);
Stevenson & Doleac, supra note 4, at 13 (finding that risk assessments in Virginia's sentencing structure
have led judges to impose sentences that are 29-46 percent longer where not classified as low risk);
Collins, Punishing Risk, supra note 29, at 68-69 (providing anecdotal evidence of a Wisconsin judge
sentencing a defendant to longer term of incarceration due to the influence of an actuarial risk
assessment).
204. See Erin Murphy, Paradigms ofRestraint, 57 DUKE L.J. 1321, 1333-34 (2008) (noting the
expansion of GPS monitoring for sex offenders beyond formal supervision periods and to expanding
types of offenders); Avlana K. Eisenberg, Mass Monitoring, 90 S. CAL. L. REV. 123 (2017) (noting
critiques of GPS monitoring devices as a supplement rather than a substitute for other forms of
punishment and suggesting constitutional limits to prevent this occurrence); see also id. at 152 n.168
(collecting citations that highlight the challenges associated with seeking or maintaining a job while on
electronic monitoring).
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which in itself demands some form of response-their incapacitative nature
will go unnoticed or worse, be considered beneficial.20 5
At a theoretical level, this social transformation is deeply problematic.
As Michael Tonry and Cecelia Klingele have recently warned, the rise of
actuarial risk tools introduces the threat of forgetting our past.206 This
counternarrative offers new insight to this tension. Actuarial risk tools
"work" as a neorehabilitative reform because the standard narrative
obscures history, or at least reframes it in a positive light. Not only does it
obscure the problematic history of science run amok in correction
facilities,20 7 it also redefines why we turned away from rehabilitation at all.
Part of that turn, as Michael Tonry notes, was driven by demands for
individual rights.2 08 Statistically robust risk tools certainly undermine that
value.209
Yet revisiting the role of technology in the demise of rehabilitation
highlights another, more structural change in how we chose to allocate
government resources. The narrative of technological advancement mutes
the politically driven question of how to cope with conditions deemed
undesirable, offensive, or threatening. Actuarial risk tools, particularly with
their loose affiliation with rehabilitation, legitimate "intensified intrusion
and castigatory oversight" rather than, for example, investing in
communities and general welfare as if the two were equivalent political
options.2 10 Just because we can predict risk does not mean that we should
deal, or always have dealt, with it through the criminal appartus. Indeed,
historian Elizabeth Hinton's recent book on the transition from the War on
Poverty to the War on Crime hinges on the political shift in focusing on risk
in criminal justice administration rather than outside it.2 11 The rise of
actuarial risk tools at sentencing highlights this transformation as well.
Actuarial risk tools proliferated in the parole and prison context as a means
to isolate localized communities from criminal justice. At the same time,
the state underwent a fundamental restructuring whereby it placed resources
in criminal enforcement while defunding the welfare state. The orientation
205. See, e.g., Eisenberg, supra note 204 (analyzing electronic monitoring as punishment through
lens of rehabilitation, deterrence, and retribution but specifically excluding analysis through an
incapacitative lens).
206. See Tonry, Issues, supra note 74, at 167; Klingele, supra note 20, at 575 76 (noting the
"danger of forgetting" that risk tools present in corrections).
207. See, e.g., Meghan J. Ryan, Science and the New Rehabilitation, 3 VA. J. CRIM. L. 261 (2015);
Klingele, supra note 20, at 575-77.
208. Tonry, Issues, supra note 74, at 167.
209. See generally id.
2 10. WACQUANT, supra note 17, at xxi-ii; Bernard E. Harcourt, Punitive Preventive Justice: A
Critique, in PREVENTION AND THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 252, 270- 71 (Andrew Ashworth et al.
eds., 2013).
211. HINTON, supra note 97.
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around technology assisted in the obfuscation of this political
transformation.212
The standard narrative obscures these changes while removing actuarial
risk tools' negative association. Entwining rehabilitation's resurgence and
incapacitation through the technical advancement narrative operates to
restructure debates about risk tools' advance. In the process, it centers the
focus on risk management and why it could work through various programs,
rather than what we are doing and its effects on society. Furthermore, to the
extent that scholars and policymakers perceive the rise of risk tools as a turn
away from retribution rather than just the expansion of incapacitation, they
are even less likely to accord skepticism in the face of tools. 213 By
combining the rehabilitative framing and technological advancement
narrative, these features undermine the impetus to limit risk technologies on
the basis of philosophies.214 This would include, for example, requiring
consideration of risk tools in instances where assessments can be regularly
administered or limiting the factors upon which risk tools are constructed.2 15
B. Uniformity, Structural Racism, and Technical Formalism
If the first transformation pertains to the conception of a theoretical
justification of punishment, the second concerns the relationship between
racial justice and technology. Racial justice here means confronting the
causes and consequences of enduring racial stratification, most visibly
enforced through criminal law. To the extent that parole and sentencing
guidelines were adopted in the name of reducing racial disparities neither
would resolve that structural dilemma. But instead of recognizing these
technologies as an institutionalization of sociohistorical inequalities, studies
and policymakers proclaimed it a solution to those inequalities. In the
process, the guidelines would fuel an orientation around technical
212. Id.; see also Harcourt, supra note 210, at 270-71.
213. This "pendulum swing" may be more rhetorical than practical. As Paul Butler noted in 1999,
it is difficult to describe much of the sentencing policies of the last thirty years as adhering to retribution
rather than incapacitation. See Paul Butler, Retribution, for Liberals, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1873, 1883-84
(1999) (noting that the retributive aims of punishment would require reducing racialized impact of
punishment); see also Kyron Huigens, Solving the Apprendi Puzzle, 90 GEO. L.J. 387, 415-16 (2002)
(noting the "uninterrupted dominance of consequentialist conceptions of punishment through most of
the last century" despite claims of retribution-oriented reform).
214. See Klingele, supra note 20, at 575 ("In many ways, the very term 'rehabilitation,' with its
connotations of concern for the welfare of the marginalized, provides a dangerous veneer that makes
observers less keen to possible abuses of 'rehabilitative' tools.").
215. See Eaglin, Constructing, supra note 12, at 161-62 (discussing how criminial justice values
could shape risk tool construction issues); Collins, Punishing Risk, supra note 29, at 91-108 (expressing
doubt about the use of actuarial risk assessments designed for correctional purposes when used at
sentencing).
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formalism in sentencing that is critical to the advance of actuarial risk tools
now.
This critique draws, by analogy, on the racial realism literature advanced
in response to formal equality as a civil rights strategy. While demanding
formal equality led to some transformations in society, critics like Derrick
Bell have noted that "abstract principles lead to legal results that harm
blacks and perpetuate their inferior status."2 16 Critically, formal equality
facilitated abstraction from historical realities, contemporary statistics, and
flexible reasoning while "mask[ing] policy choices and value
judgments." 2 17 These equality-focused reforms are more harmful, some
suggest, because they permit relief from guilt or fear of disparate treatment
without meaningful engagement in the realities of race and society.2 18
The same can be said of the guidelines and the pursuit of excessive
uniformity. Like the focus on formal equality in constitutional jurisprudence,
state and federal governments shifted toward a focus on excessive
uniformity in sentencing, this time driven by the notion that a partially
automating tool, constructed in the abstract, could reduce the threat of
"arbitrary" sentencing. 219 And much like the claims that formal equality
succeeded in reducing racial discrimination in society, researchers and
studies proclaimed that sentencing guidelines eliminated racial
disparities. 220 Together, these notions supported the conclusion that
technical projects could fix problems of race and punishment by
standardizing sentencing inputs and outcomes.
But the guidelines did not "fix" sentencing; rather, they mechanized it.
Beyond the concerns of redistributing sentencing discretion-which are
216. Derrick Bell, Racial Realism, 24 CONN. L. REv. 363, 369 (1992).
217. Id.
218. See, e.g., Reva B. Siegel, Discrimination in the Eyes of the Law: How "Color Blindness"
Discourse Disrupts and Rationalizes Social Stratification, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 77, 83, 90'91 (2000); Reva
Siegel, Why Equal Protection No Longer Protects: The Evolving Forms ofStatus-Enforcing State Action,
49 STAN. L. REV. 1111, Il 19-21 (1997) (developing framework of "preservation-through-
transformation" in equal protection law).
219. Compare Ogletree, supra note 142, at 1958 (calling for race-conscious provisions to
ameliorate the U.S. Sentencing Commission's failure to address racial disparities in federal sentencing
guidelines), with Samuel L. Myers, Jr., Racial Disparities in Sentencing: Can Sentencing Reforms
Reduce Discrimination in Punishment?, 64 U. COLO. L. REV. 781, 792 (1993) (respectfully critiquing
Ogletree's intervention as "fall[ing] into the same trap" as other race-conscious affirmative action
initiatives while demonstrating the shortcomings of parole guidelines in reducing racial disparities for
parole release). For insight into the vagueness of "arbitrary" sentencing, see NAOMI MURAKAWA, THE
FIRST CIVIL RIGHT: How LIBERALS BUILT PRISON AMERICA 106-11 (2014).
220. For a list of studies proclaiming guidelines' success in reducing disparities at sentencing, see
Albert W. Alschuler, The Failure of Sentencing Guidelines: A Plea for Less Aggregation, 58 U. CHI. L.
REV. 901, 915-16 (1991) [hereinafter Alschuler, Failure]; Naomi Murakawa & Katherine Beckett, The
Penology ofRacial Innocence: The Erasure ofRacism in the Study and Practice ofPunishment, 44 LAW
& SoC'Y REV. 695, 713 (2010); see generally SAMUEL WALKER, TAMING THE SYSTEM: THE CONTROL
OF DISCRETION IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 1950-1990 (1993).
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significant 221 -the guidelines made the distribution of punishment more
standardized. In large part, this disadvantaged minority defendants because
various mitigating factors were excluded or given limited application.22 2 To
the extent that these guidelines were implemented to address or reduce
racial disparities, their "success" is highly debatable. Racial disparities
increased in states with or without guidelines during the tough-on-crime
decades of the 1980s-1990s.223 While supporters of the guidelines advance
studies demonstrating reductions in disparity in guideline states, these
studies often consider legal factors-like criminal history-as nonracial
factors. But this assumption takes for granted the social construction of
criminal records. It takes for granted that "the larger context of penal
expectations-what constitutes disorder, which behaviors are considered
dangerous, and how government should respond-is race-neutral." 224
Indeed, Albert Alschuler surmised that such studies often "reveal only that
the new regime has more consistently applied its own standards" without
interrogating those "standards." 225 Nevertheless, the tinkering with
technical sentencing guidelines is considered an appealing intervention
when faced with issues of persistent racial disparities.226
One could ascribe resistance to recognizing the persistence of structural
racism permeating in the carceral system as a feature of the standard
technological advancement narrative as well. As Naomi Murakawa
demonstrates in the context of the federal sentencing guidelines,
conservatives and progressives alike converged on modernizing the carceral
machine as a means to address structural issues of race in society. 2 27 For
progressives, eliminating the threat of arbitrary discretion would do the
work of vindicating racial justice. For conservatives, it would eliminate the
possibility of soft judging. On both sides, however, there was a belief that
technology could make sentencing better, even if (or because) it required
disengaging from reality.2 28
221. For an overview of the prosecutorial discretion dilemma in the reallocation of sentencing
discretion, see, for example, Rachel E. Barkow, Essay, The Ascent of the Administrative State and the
Demise of Mercy, 121 HARv. L. REV. 1332 (2008).
222. See Ogletree, supra note 142, at 1957-58; see also Andrea Roth, Trial by Machine, 104 GEO.
L.J. 1245, 1266 (2016) (noting that efforts to mechanize criminal justice administration typically point
"away from undue leniency").
223. See, e.g., MICHAEL TONRY, MALIGN NEGLECT-RACE, CRIME, AND PUNISHMENT IN
AMERICA 4 (1995).
224. Murakawa & Beckett, supra note 220, at 709.
225. Alschuler, Failure, supra note 220, at 917; see also Albert W. Alschuler, Monarch, Lackey,
or Judge, 64 U. COLO. L. REV. 723, 734-35 (1993).
226. Jelani Jefferson Exum, Forget Sentencing Equality: Moving from the "Cracked" Cocaine
Debate Toward Particular Purpose Sentencing, 18 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 95, 148-49 (2014)
(describing the U.S. Sentencing Commission's response to racially disparate mandatory minimums).
227. See MURAKAWA, supra note 219, at 109.
228. See id.
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Putting aside the empirical debate about whether the tools reduced racial
disparities or not, they certainly transformed sentencing outcomes. Sentence
lengths increased for crimes that disproportionately affect black defendants.
As a case in point, drug sentences for crack cocaine increased significantly
with the proliferation of federal guidelines. 229 As Jelani Jefferson Exum
recently noted, the federal sentencing guidelines anchor crack sentences to
powder sentences while overlooking the substantive question of what makes
drug sentences just for any defendant. 2 3 0 Even as the guidelines have been
revised to encourage flexibility, they manipulate what judges and society
consider the base from which any sentence should be distributed.
Yet sentencing's technological counternarrative suggests that the
institutionalization of technical guidelines had other effects on society
beyond just the transformation of sentencing outcomes. The proliferation of
actuarial risk tools in response to the sociohistorical phenomenon of mass
incarceration indicates that technical guidelines may have triggered two
transformations pertaining to race and technology at sentencing: they reified
structural inequality while deifying technical formalism.23 ' In other words,
the guidelines as predecessor technical tools borne of formal equality
undermine the role that racial and other social justice claims have on the
proliferation of actuarial risk tools now.
Take reification first. The proclamation that guidelines "worked" may
have naturalized persistent racial inequities in society and in sentencing
outcomes. After creating guidelines with little reference to the political
realities of the times-for example, the racialized enforcement of drugs232 -
sentencing guidelines often expanded racial disparities rather than reducing
them. Nowhere is this more prevalent than in the implementation of criminal
history enhancements as recidivism predictors, a point that Bemard
Harcourt emphasizes in his assault on the effect of the actuarial.233 Yet this
critique applies more broadly. When juxtaposed against the objective and
standardized technical guidelines, a "natural" conclusion is that black
defendants receive disparate sentences because they engage in more cnme.
Refusal to engage with the broader structural conditions that lead defendants
229. See Exum, supra note 226, at 105 (federal sentencing guidelines accompanied increased
sentence lengths for drug offenses).
230. Id. at 119--22, 137-43.
231. See DERRICK BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM OF THE WELL: THE PERMANENCE OF RACISM
101 (1992) ("[T]he legal rules regarding racial discrimination have become not only reified (that is,
ascribing material existence and power to what are really just ideas -as the modem inheritor of realism,
critical legal studies, would say-but deified.").
232. See, e.g., Exum, supra note 226, at 136 (noting that "irrational sentencing policies . . . are
largely facilitated by unequal law enforcement and prosecution tactics").
233. See Bernard E. Harcourt, Risk as a Proxy for Race: The Dangers ofRisk Assessment, 27 FED.
sENT'G REP. 237 (2015) [hereinafter Harcourt, Risk]; see also AGAINST PREDICTION, supra note 1.
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of color to have longer criminal records is in itself a kind of structural
*234
racism.
Actuarial risk tools build from this insight in more overt ways. The
presumption that social conditions are natural is a necessary precondition to
the advance of actuarial risk tools to distribute punishment. It suggests that
all defendants are formally equal, but some are more likely to commit crime
in the future. This is contrary to reality,2 35 and can function to "launder in"
structural racism. 23 6 As I have repeatedly asserted, the "objective" factors
that culminate to produce "risk" reflect the realities of social neglect and
susceptibility to police surveillance.2 37 While tools do not consider race
directly, they consider factors that correlate with historical disadvantage. As
two criminologists recently put it:
Why are you at risk? Well, perhaps you have been involved in law
breaking in the past-or, perhaps you have spent time as a young
Black man in a community where you will be watched very closely
and likely detained for behaviors that would not draw the attention of
police in white suburban neighborhoods.2 38
One could expand this out, as Naomi Murakawa and Katherine Beckett
have, to question why interpersonal violence disproportionately occurs
amongst marginalized populations, particularly young black men. 239
Structural disadvantage-meaning lack of access to resources-gives
important context to both criminal history and interpersonal violence, which
234. See Murakawa & Beckett, supra note 220, at 706 (critiquing the focus on intent-based
discrimination in criminal justice administration as a means to "obscure[] the role of race in the U.S.
stratification system, the construction of particular issues as crime problems, and in shaping the current
propensity to rely on coercive social control mechanisms to solve those problems").
235. Bernard Harcourt spends a great deal of time explaining why orienting criminal justice
policies around risk is not likely to reduce crime, focusing on the elasticities of various subpopulations.
See AGAINST PREDICTION, supra note 1. I have summarized this empirical argument in the context of
"rehabilitative" tools as well. See Eaglin, Against Neorehabilitation, supra note 5.
236. See GEOFF K. WARD, THE BLACK CHILD SAVERS: RACIAL DEMOCRACY AND JUVENILE
JUSTICE (2012) (laundering in racial bias in structured decisionmaking generally); Tim Goddard &
Randolph R. Myers, Against Evidence-Based Oppression: Marginalized Youth and the Politics ofRisk-
Based Assessment and Intervention, 21 THEORETICAL CRIMINOLOGY 151, 157 (2017) (laundering in
racial bias in risk tools specifically).
237. Eaglin, Against Neorehabilitation, supra note 5; Eaglin, supra note 63; Eaglin, Constructing,
supra note 12. For a powerful summary of the ways black people are disproportionately vulnerable to
racialized policing techniques, see Devon W. Carbado, Predatory Policing, 85 UMKC L. REV. 545, 549
(2017). For a theoretical framework to further conceptualize how criminal justice administration
operates to exacerbate and solidify social marginalization, see Monica C. Bell, Police Reform and the
Dismantling ofLegal Estrangement, 126 YALE L.J. 2054, 2083 (2017).
238. Goddard & Myers, supra note 236, at 157.
239. See Murakawa & Beckett, supra note 220, at 704-06 (explaining how social science critiques
of interpersonal violence and criminal history can downplay or erase structural racism).
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actuarial risk tools (and their proponents) deflect.24 0 In other words, the
produced disorder of criminal administration becomes the natural order of
things when translated into technical assessments of "risk." 2 4 1
Actuarial risk tools reify race in the sense that they breathe life into the
pervasive stereotype of black criminality, framed in the rhetoric of objective
and empirical data. Actuarial risk tools treat socially constructed factors as
objective and translate them into an assessment of criminal propensity.
While justified as a technical means to reduce incarceration,
institutionalizing this reform threatens to reinforce the heart of the criminal-
black-man myth. That is, it may affirm the notion that black people (young
black men in particular) are more dangerous.2 42 This is a place we have been
before.243 Only now the data being used is inaccessible and the narrative
surrounding it-that of technology-is more durable because we are further
enmeshed in the pursuit of technical knowledge.
To the second point, the introduction of technical guidelines may have
deified technical reforms both as the way to fix sentencing and as the means
to address racial disparities. Here, following the insights of both political
scientist Naomi Murakawa and historian Elizabeth Hinton, efforts to
modernize the carceral apparatus since the 1960s have been the way to
address critiques of criminal justice and society more broadly.2 44 To the
extent that advocates encourage risk tools as a means to address the crisis
of mass incarceration, it appears in line with these previous efforts.
Certainly, some states and the federal government are investing a significant
amount of time, energy, and resources in developing and defending risk
tools in recent years. 245 The critique that judges have the "wrong
information" and technology can improve upon it similarly bolsters the
analogy.
The larger point here, however, is that the technical guidelines may have
encouraged the formalism with which many approach actuarial risk tools
today. This "technical formalism" refers to two things. First, the broader
notion that "recidivism risk" is objective rather than socially constructed,
and that factors used to construct it are objective and neutral as well. Second,
240. See id. at 706 (critiquing social science research on criminal justice and racial discrimination
more broadly).
241. See THE ILLUSION OF ORDER, supra note 1, at 150, 161 (discussing Foucault's notion of
subject creation and noting that social concepts are shaped by our punitive practices).
242. See, e.g., Dorothy E. Roberts, Foreword: Race, Vagueness, and the Social Meaning ofOrder-
Maintenance Policing, 89 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 775 (1999); KATHERYN RUSSELL-BROWN, THE
COLOR OF CRIME (2d ed. 2009).
243. See KHALIL GIBRAN MUHAMMAD, THE CONDEMNATION OF BLACKNESS: RACE, CRIME, AND
THE MAKING OF MODERN URBAN AMERICA (2010).
244. HINTON, supra note 97; MURAKAWA, supra note 219.
245. See Eaglin, Constructing, supra note 12 (for example Virginia, Pennsylvania, and the federal
system).
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the notion that by achieving empirical accuracy regardless of tool
construction, tools are legitimate at sentencing just as much as they are in
other contexts. Both encourage allowing technology to dictate sentencing
policy rather than our human values.
Two caveats are important here. This argument does not suggest that
relying on inaccurate risk tools is a better alternative. No, the point is that
we are choosing to double down on technology in the face of a social crisis.
We have, following Harcourt, "chosen this [technical] conception of just
punishment ... [o]r rather, it chose us." 2 46 When we cede the foundation of
sentencing to technical knowledge because of racial justice critiques, we
bind ourselves to the pursuit of technical knowledge. It will not fix
discrimination, but it may exacerbate structural racism in ways we cannot
yet fathom.
To the second caveat, this critique is not meant to excoriate the notion of
sentencing guidelines-guidance to the court is valuable. But the way we
chose to write guidelines-as technical projects derived of World War II
and Cold War technologies-had an impact that cannot be quantified, but
is being replicated. To the extent that scholars and advocates insist upon a
"compared to what" argument, that too is the technological advancement
narrative at work in sentencing. There are other ways to address racial
inequality in the distribution of punishment. As Jelani Jefferson Exum
recently suggested, one approach would be to focus on the purposes of
punishment that guide judges. 247 Another is to write the guidelines
substantively rather than technically-a point Albert Alschuler has made
for years.24 8 In other words, state actors could try to parse out what makes a
defendant more or less culpable descriptively. We chose not to do that, and
that decision had a substantive effect on society illuminated by the
proliferation of actuarial risk tools as sentencing reform today. It eroded our
normative values about how to limit or regulate technologies at sentencing.
C. From Dangerousness to Recidivism Risk
As a final transformation, the extent to which we care about technical
assessments of recidivism risk as a social norm is the effect of previous
punishment practices and policies. The pursuit of technical knowledge
interwoven with the transformation of punishment practices would
legitimate and obscure the conflation of "recidivism risk" and "future
dangerousness" upon which actuarial risk tools now build. In this context,
246. AGAINST PREDICTION, supra note 1, at 32 (emphasis omitted).
247. Exum, supra note 226, at 143-45 (explaining Particular Purpose Sentencing).
248. See, e.g., Alschuler, Failure, supra note 220, at 941-45 (proposing descriptive guidelines
rather than data-driven technical grids).
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three things happened at once to facilitate this seemingly pervasive overlap
in terms: the "system" expanded while opportunities for exit disappeared,
particularly for poor and marginalized communities, in invisible ways;
ongoing technosocial projects committed to shoring up expertise would
legitimate the transition from dangerousness to risk; and the politics of
crime would drive a generalizing fear that spans from fear of danger to fear
of any crime, no matter the type, under the assumption that people who
commit low level crimes could actually be much more threatening and
require incapacitation. These transformations converge to sustain a
nondiscriminating acceptance of actuarial risk tools at sentencing.
The idea of a criminal justice "system" creates a problematic closed loop
effect on criminal justice actors. As criminal justice actors embraced
abstraction and system-wide visualization through the guidelines, the tools
would simultaneously obscure various problematic realities in criminal
justice. In particular, the guidelines would obscure the significant impact of
prosecutorial discretion in charging different crimes for similar behavior.24 9
It centered sentence outcomes on the basis of quantifiable metrics like drug
weight or amount stolen, even when these metrics could easily distort the
significance of the crime and led to objectively irrational sentence
outcomes.25 0 It also erased important distinctions between defendants and
crimes in the effort to standardize outcomes. 2 5 1 Following another scholar's
recent critique of system in criminal justice, "'[c]rime' was where the
[technosocial reform] began, a category of inputs from somewhere out there
in society that, for the system's purposes, could be taken as given." 25 2 The
abstract technosocial tools would obscure the how and the why of the
processing.
This "closed loop" phenomenon would prove critical to the advance of
actuarial risk tools. The very idea that a risk assessment tool could facilitate
justice presumes that there is justice in the data that the system produces.
Said differently, technosocial reforms like the guidelines can inadvertently
erase "[the] different actors with different interests, incentives, and
249. See, e.g., Sonja B. Starr & M. Marit Rehavi, Mandatory Sentencing and Racial Disparity:
Assessing the Role of Prosecutors and the Effects of Booker, 123 YALE L.J. 2, 6 (2013) (noting the
"surprisingly wide gap" between theoretical and qualitative literature on prosecutorial discretion shaping
sentencing outcomes and empirical research that "effectively ignores that role"). As Starr and Rehavi
specifically note: "[T]he guidelines recommendation is itself the end product of charging, plea-
bargaining, and sentencing fact-finding." Id.
250. See Alschuler, Failure, supra note 220, at 918 (discussing "troubling inequalities produced
in the name of equality by sentencing guidelines" and discussing Chapman v. United States, 500 U.S.
453 (1991)).
251. Id. at 918-24.
252. Mayeux, supra note 14, at 81.
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prior[ assumptions]."2 53 With the guidelines, it erased the presumptions of
prosecutors, technical developers, commissioners, and more. 254 Risk
assessment tools function similarly, erasing the assumptions and flaws that
produce the data being manipulated as much as the meanings ascribed to the
manipulated data.25 5
At the same time, social science researchers were hard at work
reaffirming the legitimacy of social scientific expertise after critiques placed
doubts on the assessment of future dangerousness. 2 56 In particular, a series
of studies were launched that would culminate in the emphatic transition
from future dangerousness to risk.257 Risk is much broader in scope and
administrative in origin.258 Any defendant presents some risk of future
criminal behavior, just as any law-abiding individual presents the same
possibility. 259 Starting with the deinstitutionalization of mental health
facilities and expanding with the rise of preventive detention laws, actuarial
risk tools were a point of ongoing research whilst punitive policies
increasingly endorsed reliance on incarceration. As the line between
sexually violent predators and criminal justice blended, resistance to
actuarial risk tools in sentencing would diminish. So while all or nothing
clinical assessments of dangerousness were debunked, broader notions of
253. Benjamin Levin, Values and Assumptions in Criminal Adjudication, 129 HARV. L. REV. F.
379, 384 (2016).
254. For example, consider the literature critiquing prosecutorial charging practices and their
impact in a guideline structure. See supra note 249.
255. Levin, supra note 253, at 384 (calling for more information about courts and the actors in
them before ascribing meaning to data produced by courts); Eaglin, Constructing, supra note 12, at 139-
40 (questioning the assumptions of technologists manipulating data); see also generally HINTON, supra
note 97, at 14-15, 18-25 (critiquing production and manipulation of criminal justice data).
256. Criticism stemmed from reforms concerning the mentally ill, which led to legal, political,
and empirical critiques of"psy-experts" assessing future dangerousness to influence the confinement of
criminal defendants. Simon, supra note 65, at 400-04. From the social scientific perspective, research
demonstrated that the results of clinical predictions of future dangerousness were often wrong. JOHN
MONAHAN, THE CLINICAL PREDICTION OF VIOLENT BEHAVIOR (1981). From the legal perspective, a
series of cases concerning the due process rights of mentally ill ex-prisoners cast doubt on the prevailing
idea that judges and psy-experts should predict dangerousness in criminal justice decisionmaking. These
critiques converged with political resistance grounded in notions of equality-demands not to treat
people differently based on race, ethnicity, gender, age, and social class. Tonry, Issues, supra note 74,
at 167. When added to the larger penological shift away from rehabilitation, a general skepticism
emerged regarding criminal justice decisionmakers using or making predictions of future dangerousness.
See id; see also Simon, supra note 65, at 402-03.
257. Nikolas Rose, At Risk of Madness, in EMBRACING RISK: THE CHANGING CULTURE OF
INSURANCE AND RESPONSIBILITY 209, 211-12 (Tom Baker & Jonathan Simon eds., 2010) (providing
an overview of the research conducted by Herbert Steadman and John Monahan in conjunction with the
MacArthur Foundation).
258. Id. at 210-13.
259. See id.; cf Sandra G. Mayson, Dangerous Defendants, 127 YALE L.J. 490, 520 (2018)
(arguing that state authority for preventive restraint derives from dangerousness level rather than status
as defendant/nondefendant in the pretrial context).
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risk were given social scientific legitimacy that spread from mental health
to the criminal justice context. 260
Finally, fear of crime would stoke anxieties and fuel the politicization of
any criminal risk, including the risk of returning for any reason. Two
diverging perceptions of criminals as either evil or indecipherable gave
legitimacy to fears of any kind of lawbreaking, regardless of the crime
committed or the context in which it occurred. 2 6 1 Politicized, racialized, and
media-fueled instances of individuals committing crimes after release from
criminal justice custody only confirmed these fears. 262 In addition,
messaging that crime existed exclusively within the individual made the
prospect of incapacitative punishment deeply appealing. 2 6 3 States started
implementing severe recidivist enhancements.26 4 Simultaneously, the risk
of recidivism of any type would take hold in the public psyche. What
emerged was a concern for recidivism of any kind.
Yet starting in the late 1980s, significant changes to criminal justice both
expanded the opportunities for capture within the criminal apparatus while
erasing the opportunity for successful exit, particularly for poor and
marginalized defendants. Increased funding to police and increased
investment in criminal justice infrastructure produced an upsurge in arrests
for comparatively minor crimes.26 5 As Hinton demonstrates, these efforts
were specifically directed at poor urban communities, which helps to
explain the overrepresentation of people of color in that arrest surge.26 6
Increased contact, in turn, leads to increased arrest and possible conviction,
even if only for misdemeanor offenses.267 Arrests and convictions for even
misdemeanor offenses can trigger a cycle of surveillance and exclusion that
260. For a more in-depth consideration of the rise of risk as compared to dangerousness in the
mental health context, see Rose, supra note 257; Henry J. Steadman et al., From Dangerousness to Risk
Assessment: Implications for Appropriate Research Strategies, in MENTAL DISORDER AND CRIME 39
(Sheilagh Hodgins ed., 1993); Robert Castel, From Dangerousness to Risk, in THE FOUCAULT EFFECT:
STUDIES IN GOVERNMENTALITY 281 (Graham Burchell et al. eds., 1991).
261. For discussion of these dual images, see GARLAND, supra note 90, at 134; see also SIMON,
supra note 177, at 36.
262. As a notable example, consider the extensive literature on Willie Horton and sentencing
policy. For discussion, see MURAKAWA, supra note 219, at 108.
263. Sharon Dolovich, Exclusion and Control in the Carceral State, 16 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L.
259, 265 (2011).
264. See Eaglin, Against Neorehabilitation, supra note 5 (summarizing incapacitative sentencing
reforms); see also King, supra note 72, at 532 37 (providing an overview of recidivism enhancements
starting in the 1970s).
265. See HINTON, supra note 97, at 146-62. Examples of expanded "infrastructure" go beyond
just the introduction of administrative agencies to the creation of technical infrastructure like criminal
record databases and other types of resources that allowed for the efficient surveillance of marginalized
communities. See id.
266. Id. at 177.
267. Carbado, supra note 237, at 546 ("A variety of social forces (including broken windows
policing, racial stereotypes, racial segregation, and Fourth Amendment law) converge to make African-
Americans vulnerable to ongoing police surveillance and contact.").
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makes the process of exiting the criminal justice apparatus more difficult.2 6 8
Among other practices, the rise of criminal justice debt would also trap
defendants, creating a revolving door of arrests, convictions, and technical
violations. 269 Actuarial tools assessing recidivism risk measure these
15270
occurrences just as much as they predict "future dangerousness.
Understanding this conflation is critical to contextualizing the
institutionalization of actuarial risk tools at sentencing now. Repeat
offending is frequently, if not ubiquitously, associated with the idea of
future dangerousness and future offending. It is, as Harcourt asserts, "a
semiotic shaped by the new technology of prediction." 2 7 1 We believe risk
tools are indispensable to sentencing now because it evokes a threat of
dangerousness. We associate recidivism with dangerousness because that is
what technical projects started to predict.
Of course, the preoccupation with recidivism risk cannot be attributed to
the creation of guidelines alone. Many states did not adopt guidelines, and
many states that did chose not to maintain some of the most draconian
policies reflected in, for example, the federal sentencing guidelines.
Nevertheless, the pursuit of system control through technical reforms
naturalized the mutation of sentencing such that actuarial assessments of
recidivism risk would appear normal if not necessary components in the
felony sentencing process. This, combined with a pervasive faith in
technological advancement, would prove central to the rise of risk tools as
a response to demands that law and policymakers address the pressures of
mass incarceration.
IV. REFRAMING THE RISE OF RISK TOOLS AT SENTENCING
So far this Article exposes a counternarrative about actuarial risk tools
entering sentencing. Contrary to the standard narrative that technology
advances to improve sentencing, this narrative suggests that risk tools'
advance is the effect of social transformations catalyzed by previous
sentencing technologies. Technology may be advancing, but society has
changed in problematic ways to make statistically robust risk tools more
palatable at sentencing.
268. Id.; see also Eisha Jain, Arrests as Regulation, 67 STAN. L. REV. 809, 812-13 (2015) (noting
how arrests, even for misdemeanor offenses, function as a "screening tool" or a "low-cost audit
mechanism" to access social services, obtain jobs, and other everyday functions).
269. See, e.g., ALEXES HARRIS, A POUND OF FLESH: MONETARY SANCTIONS AS PUNISHMENT FOR
THE POOR (2016); Murakawa & Beckett, supra note 220, at 717-19 (noting protracted exit points from
the system and highlighting increasing monetary penalties and alternatives to incarceration).
270. See Eaglin, Constructing, supra note 12, at 76.
271. AGAINST PREDICTION, supra note 1, at 189-91.
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This Part takes up the normative value of this counternarrative. Part A
situates the counternarrative in political terms. It considers whether
exposing the counternarrative is good or bad in the face of mass
incarceration. Part B identifies the value of this counternarrative in practical
context-for the courts in sentencing jurisprudence and for the normative
debates on the future of sentencing reforms. It pushes to the fore problematic
trends obscured in debates about accuracy and rhetoric of technological
advancement.
A. The Politics ofNarrative
The standard narrative and its counternarrative offer competing ways to
frame the expansion of actuarial risk tools at sentencing. Framing narratives
shape, drive, and justify reforms and debate. Right now, tool accuracy is a
topic of hot debate because it fits within the standard narrative of
technological advancement. While this narrative has a political value
because it depoliticizes mass incarceration, this Part suggests that the cost
of this reform is greater than that narrative's logical end point-accuracy-
can bear. As such, it asserts that the countemarrative is necessary to shape
debates about the expansion of actuarial risk tools.
To the extent that law and policymakers pose risk tools as a means to
reduce incarceration, they are playing on the turn toward empiricism as a
means to cope with political pressures of mass incarceration. 272 The
standard narrative works well in this respect. To the extent that race and
class are raised in this debate, they are secondary to the larger concern of
technology for technology's sake: empirical accuracy. For example, claims
that including certain factors undermines social justice values are often
dismissed because such removal would undermine a tool's technical
accuracy. 273 Claims that actuarial risk tools will disproportionately
mischaracterize racial minorities, too, are dismissed on the basis of technical
accuracy.27 4 Yet the social history of risk tools indicates that technical
accuracy does not account for why states are adopting the tools. This helps
explain why recent studies debating whether the tools are more or less
272. See, e.g., PFAFF, supra note 11, at 198 200 (encouraging actuarial risk assessment tools as
reform to cope with political pressures of mass incarceration). But see, e.g., Levin, supra note 253, at
387 (highlighting shortcomings in the "power of empiricism"). Cf Alice Ristroph, Desert, Democracy,
and Sentencing Reform, 96 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1293, 1335 (2006) (noting the "age of
empiricism" as early as 2005 and critiquing its influence on retributive theories of punishment).
273. See, e.g., Slobogin, Defense, supra note 26, at 11-13 (noting the tension between fit, validity,
and fairness principles when considering a tool used at sentencing).
274. See, e.g., Sandra G. Mayson, Bias In, Bias Out, 128 YALE L.J. 2218, 2233-38 (2019)
(summarizing diverging perspectives on actuarial risk assessments' effect on racial minorities and noting
divide between effect and statistical accuracy).
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accurate than judges are not likely to temper risk tools' advance. 275
Nevertheless, accuracy operates to narrow the scope of critique about risk
tools. As a natural endpoint of the technological advancement narrative, it
also urges the inclusion of factors that undermine philosophical and
normative limits. In other words, "accuracy" debates simply cannot bear the
full implications of risk tools' ascent. That is not its purpose.
This displacement makes risk tools as a technosocial reform also a
quintessential neorehabilitative reform. The language of technical accuracy
"disaggregate[s] ... crime from social and governmental forces" and instead
focuses on individual character and responsibility. 27 6 Even as scholars and
policymakers try to write politics into tools, the standard narrative operates
to silence them. For progressives and conservatives alike, this limitation has
appeal. For progressives, this opens the possibility of rehabilitation and
diversion long considered untenable for political reasons. For conservatives,
it maintains a radical individualism introduced in the 1970s that detracts
from broader critiques about structural forces.277 For both, it offers political
cover for judges and other decisionmakers in the face of pressures to do
"smart" reforms. These strands converge for both progressives and
conservatives alike to agree upon this turn toward technosocial reform.
Some would suggest that this is a good thing. One could argue that
technical accuracy offers a neutral platform to facilitate decarceration.27 8
After all, empiricism-not selective incapacitation-is the foundation of
agreement. 2 79 This is the line the ALI tries to draw in the Model Penal Code:
Sentencing provision endorsing actuarial risk tools. The ALI suggests
ambivalence to increases in incarceration while endorsing decreases on the
basis of risk.2 8 0 It is the faith in data-driven interventions that drives the
275. See Julia Dressel & Hany Farid, The Accuracy, Fairness, and Limits ofPredicting Recidivism,
4 SC. ADVANCES, Jan. 17, 2018, at 1, 2.
276. Miller, supra note 200, at 427 (noting language of therapy at center of drug courts operates
in same fashion); Eaglin, Against Neorehabiltiation, supra note 5, at 201 (connecting drug courts and
risk tools under umbrella of neorehabilitation).
277. See, e.g., WILLIAM R. KELLY ET AL., FROM RETRIBUTION TO PUBLIC SAFETY: DISRUPTIVE
INNOVATION OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 3, 11-13 (2017) (recognizing that structural problems
like poverty drive crime, but proposing solutions that emphasize "an effective mechanism or process to
sort disordered, and thus divertible, offenders from those who are violent or habitual offenders and need
to be separated from society, or those who are chronic offenders or just plain criminals and deserve
retribution and punishment"); see also Goddard & Myers, supra note 236, at 162 (noting that evidence-
based interventions ignore structural causes of crime considered not "amenable to change").
278. See Dan M. Kahan, The Secret Ambition of Deterrence, 113 HARV. L. REV. 413, 478-81
(1999) [hereinafter Kahan, Secret Ambition].
279. See, e.g., Fan, supra note 197, at 639-40 (citing Dan M. Kahan, The Cognitively Illiberal
State, 60 STAN. L. REV. 115, 145-48 (2007)).
280. MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 6B.09 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 2017) ("Section 6B.09
takes an attitude of skepticism and restraint concerning the use of high-risk predictions as a basis of
elongated prison terms, while advocating the use of low-risk predictions as grounds for diverting
otherwise prison-bound offenders to less onerous penalties."); see also supra notes 38-42 and
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reform. That reform exists at the end of a larger narrative about technical
advancement. From this perspective, a counternarrative is detrimental.
Countering the narrative means countering the depoliticized platform.
Liberalism, some would suggest, discourages such a course of action in the
face of bipartisan recognition of the need to reduce reliance on
incarceration.28 1
This approach treats the institutionalization of actuarial risk tools as
costless, or at least manageable at the outset. For example, John Pfaff
encourages the expansion of actuarial risk tools despite the controversial
inclusion of factors that correlate with race and gender in "deeply
problematic ways" because they offer a "significant" political advantage
that can lessen systemic accountability problems in criminal justice.28 2
Similarly, Kevin Reitz encourages reforms that "domesticate" risk tools at
sentencing in part because they encourage "lenity" in response to the
pressures of mass incarceration.28 3 Actuarial assessments of risk, such
critiques suggest, are just one of many tools available to cope with mass
incarceration.
The counternarrative set forth here illuminates the shortcoming of this
perspective. The institutionalization of statistically robust actuarial risk
tools is not thaumaturgic-it is a solution that emerges out of more than
sheer technical will. 2 84 Rather, it is the effect of prior technologies shaping
our human values while obscuring deeply political transformations in
society. To concede on the basis of politics to the expansion of risk tools
threatens to mask the difficult problems of historical change that create the
foundation for their very expansion. It threatens to depoliticize mass
incarceration, while legitimating a particular path away from its current size
accompanying text (describing sentencing structures in the states similar to the approach endorsed by
the ALI).
281. See Kahan, Secret Ambition, supra note 278, at 145-48 (noting the liberal argument in
support of deterrence's technical fagade). For general discussion of the bipartisan nature of criminal
justice reforms prevalent in the states, see, for example, Barack Obama, Commentary, The President's
Role in Advancing Criminal Justice Reform, 130 HARV. L. REv. 811 (2017) (highlighting bipartisan
agendas); The Conservative Case for Reform, RIGHTON CRIME, http://rightoncrime.com/the-conservativ
c-case-for-reform/ [https://perma.cc/W728-XND3] (conservative reform agenda); Mass Incarceration,
AM. Civ. LIBERTIES UNION (2019), https://www.aclu.org/issues/smart-justice/mass-incarceration [http
s://perma.cc/GJB7-SFTS] (progressive reform agenda); see also Sharon Dolovich & Alexandra Natapoff,
Introduction: Mapping the New Criminal Justice Thinking, in THE NEW CRIMINAL JUSTICE THINKING
1, I (Sharon Dolovich & Alexandra Natapoff eds., 2017) ("[T]here is an emerging willingness on all
sides to question, challenge, and rethink our existing approach to preventing and punishing crime.").
282. See PFAFF, supra note 11, at 198- 201.
283. Reitz, supra note 11, at 71 (criticizing risk tool critics for ahistorical critiques).
284. See Michel Foucault, Politics and the Study of Discourse, in THE FOUCAULT EFFECT:
STUDIES IN GOVERNMENTALITY 53, 68 (Graham Burchell et al. eds., 1991).
[VOL. 97:483536
DISTORTED CONCEPTIONS OF PUNISHMENT
and scope.285 That path includes the expansion of surveillance mechanisms
and logics from the prison to society. The standard narrative, when
combined with the fear of politics, legitimates these transformations even
while it avoids speaking of them. Whether this reform changes sentencing
outcomes-a point that advocates diverge on for various reasons 28 6-it will
change us. As the counternarrative illuminates, these reforms already have
changed us. They changed the conditions on which we interrogate technical
projects at sentencing and our understanding of its functions. Particular care,
reflection, and skepticism should be accorded to this development at the
precipice of continuing further down this path.
Exposing the tension between reality and the narrative that facilitates tool
expansion offers three valuable insights to current debates about sentencing
reforms. First, exposing this oppositional discourse undermines the
strategically simplistic advance of actuarial risk tools. This is a good thing.
A progressive politics is one that takes historical context into account. While
advocates of risk tools appear to have the upper hand on the historical
point,287 this Article makes that platform far more ambivalent. Thus, it urges
critical reflection and caution when wading into the waters of risk-based
sentencing reforms. The institutionalization of actuarial risk tools at
sentencing is not a foregone conclusion, nor has their recent expansion
prevented a meaningful change in course. This countemarrative offers a
new foundation for pause; one that does not invite the standard narrative's
singular emphasis on technical accuracy.
Second, this counternarrative offers new insight into the balance of
various criminal justice reforms being pursued to address mass
incarceration. Various reforms have emerged to address the political,
economic, and social pressures of mass incarceration. How we choose to
reduce reliance on incarceration will have implications for the long-term
effort to dismantle the sociohistorical phenomenon of mass incarceration.2 88
In a recent article, Benjamin Levin offers a particularly insightful
framework to engage with these diverging reforms. 2 8 9 As he suggests,
285. Notably, this "depoliticized" approach is exactly how we ended up with mass incarceration.
As scholars like Murakawa and Hinton have shown, it was the areas of agreement rather than
disagreement within which the perilous contours of mass incarceration took form.
286. See Starr, Rationalization, supra note 25, at 862-65 (highlighting the inconsistency in
supporters' arguments about whether tools have effect at sentencing).
287. See MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 6B.09 (AM. LAW INST. 2017); Reitz, supra note
I1; King, supra note 72, at 532-37.
288. See, e.g., Eaglin, Against Neorehabilitation, supra note 5; Eaglin, Paradigm, supra note 15;
Chaz Arnett, Virtual Shackles: Electronic Surveillance and the Adultification ofJuvenile Courts, 108 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 399 (2018); Chaz Arnett, From Decarceration to E-carceration, 41
CARDOZO L. REV. (forthcoming 2019); Aya Gruber et al., Penal Welfare and the New Human
Trafficking Intervention Courts, 68 FLA. L. REV. 1333 (2016).
289. Levin, Consensus Myth, supra note 13.
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pragmatic reforms that focus on the quantitative aspects of mass
incarceration can conflict with or undermine the potential for reforms that
address the sociohistorical aspects of this phenomenon.290 He notes, as
many critics have, that a particular shortcoming of the pragmatic approach
may be the focus on low-level, nonviolent drug offenders to the exclusion
of other, broader structural reforms that produce and sustain crime and
inequality in the United States.2 91
This counternarrative builds on Levin's intervention by illuminating the
significance of a certain type of pragmatic sentencing reform that requires
particular skepticism and caution: those that invoke the language of science
and technology as the basis of transformation.292 Technosocial reforms
which always draw on the actuarial 29 3-are not just one of many pragmatic
criminal justice reforms being adopted in the face of mass incarceration.
They are meant to change society. Yet because they operate within the
narrative of technological advancement, little scrutiny is applied to how or
why society accepts those changes. By tracing the origin of risk tools along
with transformations in society, this contribution joins in Levin's insight
that not all criminal justice reforms are the same. It also bolsters the
assertion that, in the grand scheme of criminal justice reforms emerging in
the face of mass incarceration, the institutionalization of statistically robust
actuarial risk tools is neither necessary nor preferable despite their
bipartisan appeal.294
Finally, this Article joins a growing literature aimed at igniting the
humanities in the fight against the sociohistorical phenomenon of mass
incarceration.29 5 Technological sentencing reforms are remarkable because
they do more than just diffuse motivation for more expansive sentencing
reforms aimed to address deeper issues of punishment and society. This
Article demonstrates how these reforms actually strip society of the
290. Id. at 309-15.
291. Id. at 314-15 (warning that shifting typologies may stymie broader structural reforms); see,
e.g., Eaglin, Paradigm, supra note 15 (critiquing focus on low-level, nonviolent offenders); Gruber et
al., supra note 288 (same); see generally JAMES FORMAN, JR., LOCKING UP OUR OWN: CRIME AND
PUNISHMENT IN BLACK AMERICA (2017) (critiquing exclusive focus on low-level, nonviolent offenders
to exclusion of other individuals caught in criminal justice system).
292. Risk tools exist at the intersection of both discourses on science (rehabilitation as therapy)
and technology (risk management as technical accuracy).
293. This is so because the tools are developed on the basis of World War II/Cold War
technologies wherein "the predictor" was the intervention of choice considered to have championed the
war. See HEYCK, supra note 52.
294. Harcourt, Risk, supra note 233; see also Eaglin, Against Neorehabilitation, supra note 5.
295. See, e.g., HINTON, supra note 97 (history); Mariana Valverde, "Miserology ": A New Look at
the History of Criminology, in THE NEW CRIMINAL JUSTICE THINKING 325 (Sharon Dolovich &
Alexandra Natapoff eds., 2017) (history); BERNARD E. HARCOURT, THE ILLUSION OF FREE MARKETS:
PUNISHMENT AND THE MYTH OF NATURAL ORDER (2011) [hereinafter HARCOURT, ILLUSION OF FREE
MARKETS] (history and rhetoric).
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conceptual foundations to resist both future technological reforms and the
status quo. So while it is true that actuarial risk tools could stall reforms
beyond the low-level, nonviolent drug offenders whom reformers are most
keen to consider, 2 9 6 its implications go far beyond that critique. Such
reforms shape and legitimate "moral, political, and intellectual sensibilities"
about justice that should be interrogated but will not be.2 97 The capacity to
scrutinize these sensibilities is lost because the underlying social concepts-
our words and their meaning-are changing to accommodate the
technologies. 2 98 The technologies, in turn, legitimate the status quo. The
implications are concerning. All the empirical studies in the world could
demonstrate the negative effect of the tools, but without the words to
conceptualize a problem, society is helpless to resist their advance. Yet
resisting their advance is necessary to resisting the status quo. This Article
illuminates the need for a complementary approach to oppositional research.
By writing into a space dominated by statistics, it illuminates the necessity
of the humanities as a form of resistance.
B. Combatting the Standard Narrative, Expanding Debates
Contrary to the standard narrative, sentencing's technological
counternarrative invites a broader discourse on the meaning of actuarial risk
tools entering sentencing. This section raises three interrelated concerns that
have been relatively absent from policy debates about risk tools thus far, but
should be amplified. It concludes by reflecting on the value of the
counternarrative in practical context for judges at sentencing.
The first concern relates to incapacitation logics. As actuarial risk tools
proliferate in state sentencing structures, the United States rounds its fortieth
year of incapacitation-driven sentencing reforms. If risk tools represent the
pendulum swing in punishment theory, we are not changing course. Rather,
we are changing rhetoric and methods. The standard technological narrative
obscures this deeply problematic choice of course in criminal justice, and
paradoxically it is doing so just as the crisis of mass incarceration is coming
into view.
What does it mean that incapacitation continues to dominate sentencing?
Specifically, how does this relate to the evolution of punishment theory? As
Alice Ristroph recently explained, the theories of war evolved with the
introduction of more sophisticated technologies and recognition that
296. See Eaglin, Paradigm, supra note 15.
297. AGAINST PREDICTION, supra note 1, at 187.
298. Cf AGAINST PREDICTION, supra note 1, at 188-92 (noting that the pull of prediction shapes
notions of justice).
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justifying theories of war was no longer limiting war in practice.29 9 She calls
on punishment theorists to do the same. 30 0 How does the advance of more
statistically robust actuarial risk tools play into this call for transformation?
Scholars should begin to consider this question.
The second concern relates to automation. The counternarrative
illuminates that tools change us. Technology wears us down. This insight
applies to judges just as much as it applies to society at large. The
introduction of actuarial risk tools threatens to deskill judges or devalue
their expertise by replacing it with that of a computer. Paradoxically, history
suggests that continual efforts to make sentencing easier are problematic.
Sentencing technologies offer, as Albert Alschuler noted in 1991, a way for
judges to sentence without sentencing. 301 1 concur in this insight, but
challenge myself and other scholars to articulate how and why this is
problematic going forward.
One alternative that appears imminent to me, but remains largely outside
sentencing scholars' purview, is the specter of automated judging. Indeed,
technical developers saw sentencing guidelines as a response to the possible
end of judicial discretion. 302 While judges and scholars alike vocally
resisted the proliferation of sentencing guidelines in part on this basis, the
reception to actuarial risk tools is far more ambivalent. Whether a long way
off or just around the corner, the institutionalization of risk tools makes the
specter of automated judging more possible. Like the introduction of
actuarial risk tools, this point appears deeply intertwined with the way we
interpret issues relating to the technologies at sentencing, and particularly
the once-mandatory sentencing guidelines. Scholars opposing risk
technologies in sentencing should begin to engage with this possibility as
well.
The third concern builds from the last. Tracing the origin of actuarial risk
tools in criminal justice highlights its deep connection to the introduction of
automation in the private sector in the 1950s-1960s. 303 Since the
introduction of scientific discourse with clinical rehabilitation, technical
reforms have distracted from automation and its effects on society. At the
same time, the turn toward automation transformed society by shaping our
responses to political and social crises.
299. Alice Ristroph, Just Violence, 56 ARIZ. L. REV. 1017, 1020 (2014).
300. Id.
301. Alschuler, Failure, supra note 220, at 907 n.21 ("[A] [sentencing guidelines] grid makes it
easy to assign sentences to cases without thinking about the cases. Moreover, the very use of a sentencing
grid makes some sentencing decisions de facto.").
302. See Kress et al., supra note 97, at 219 (emphasizing that sentencing guidelines avoid
disparities that arise from legislatively mandated sentencing outcomes).
303. See supra Part II.A.
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This dynamic goes far beyond just sentencing. Indeed, tracing the
technological narrative at sentencing illuminates how, in line with the work
of Loic Wacquant and Bernard Harcourt, punishment is an important arm
in a shifting governmentality.30 4 The narrative of technical advancements in
the security state operates to distract and naturalize the transformation of
government. Identifying how, over time, values change to facilitate the
technical efficiency of the government through surveillance mechanisms in
the face of deteriorating social conditions for marginalized communities is
a strand worthy of further exploration both in the punishment context and
outside it as well.30 5
The counternarrative, of course, does not have implications for scholars
alone. If nothing else, the counternarrative urges expansion of the resistance
rhetoric pervasive among risk tool critiques from policymakers and scholars
alike. It emphasizes that this language of resistance should not focus
exclusively on what risk tools mean to individual defendants. The concern
goes beyond whether it mischaracterizes defendants and undermines
notions that those who engage in crime can change.306 Rather, resistance
rhetoric should emphasize what it will do to us-to all of us-and our
notions of justice.307 Acknowledging this broader range of objections could
bolster some of the day-to-day confrontations with actuarial risk tools in the
courts.
There is some precedent for this. As noted above, the advance of risk
tools is at heart the advance of default incapacitative logics. While
incapacitation is perhaps the most difficult theory to undermine because of
its limitless nature, the United States Supreme Court recently did just that
in Graham v. Florida.30 8 There, the majority of the Court categorically
banned life without parole sentences for juvenile defendants that committed
nonhomicide offenses. 309 Notably, the majority limited default
304. See generally HARCOURT, ILLUSION OF FREE MARKETS, supra note 295, at 40-44 (critiquing
neoliberal penality in the United States); WACQUANT, supra note 17, at xviii (critiquing the role of
punishment in advancing neoliberalism in the United States and abroad).
305. See, e.g., VIRGINIA EUBANKS, AUTOMATING INEQUALITY: How HIGH-TECH TOOLS PROFILE,
POLICE, AND PUNISH THE POOR (2017) (critiquing surveillance techniques in U.S. welfare systems).
306. See, e.g., Sidhu, supra note 25 (emphasizing that risk tools undermine notions of individual
autonomy and individual capacity for change); Collins, Punishing Risk, supra note 29, at 98-106
(identifying underappreciated costs to individuals when dispensing sentences with a risk assessment
tool).
307. See, e.g., Holder, Remarks, supra note 51 (emphasizing how tools undermine criminal justice
values).
308. 560 U.S. 48 (2010).
309. Id.
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incapacitation logics. 310 After going through a discussion of risk,
dangerousness, and incorrigibility, the Court writes, "[i]ncapacitation
cannot override all other considerations." 3 1 1 In his concurrence, Justice
Stevens bolsters this claim in his defense of proportionality review. He
writes, "Society changes. Knowledge accumulates. We learn, sometimes,
from our mistakes."3 12 This statement is the heart of the counternarrative-
sometimes we get it wrong, and it is up to us to right the ship.
State courts and commissions can right the ship by resisting the pull of
actuarial risk tools in various ways. Some already have. For example, North
Carolina's Sentencing Commission considered introducing an actuarial risk
tool for sentencing and determined that their profiling practices based on
criminal history made use of actuarial tools at sentencing unnecessary. 3 13
The important point in this development is that the Commission pierced the
tools' veil to consider what risk factors were consistent with state sentencing
policy. In doing so, the Commission implicitly undermined the
technological advancement narrative. It also subtly pushed the legislature
and executive branch to find another way to reform criminal justice. Though
perhaps a small victory in the grand scheme of sentencing reform, such
resistance is critical in the face of inexorable sentencing technologies.
CONCLUSION
There is a standard narrative about technological advancement that often
shapes the discourse on actuarial risk tools entering sentencing. This Article
develops a necessary countemarrative to that standard story. Specifically, it
asserts that society is changing through and alongside technology, and not
because our human values have evolved. This Article considers how three
social concepts-rehabilitation, racial justice, and dangerousness-mutated
through and alongside predecessor technologies. These social
transformations provide the foundation for risk tools' expansion now. They
also obscure problematic transformations that sustain the sociohistorical
phenomenon of mass incarceration. These include the expansion of
government surveillance in marginalized communities, resignation to
racialized punishment practices, and the expansion of the carceral net. This
Article illuminates how these transformations remove resistance to the
expansion of actuarial risk tools today while stripping advocates of a
language to critique and resist the status quo. Thus, this Article offers
310. Id. at 73.
311. Id.
312. Id. at 85 (Stevens, J., concurring).
313. See N.C. SENTENCING & POL'Y ADVISORY COMM'N, RESEARCH FINDINGS AND POLICY
RECOMMENDATIONS FROM THE CORRECTIONAL PROGRAM EVALUATIONS, 2000-2008, at 25 (2009).
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foundation for deeper, and more skeptical, engagement with the advance of
pragmatic technological sentencing reforms.
Ultimately, this Article demands a historically situated question. Instead
of addressing structural problems in society in the 1960s, states and the
federal government started building technological infrastructure to partially
automate sentencing. Are we doing the same thing now, in the face of mass
incarceration? By placing faith in technology to save us from ourselves, are
we turning a blind eye to the structural problems that drive reliance on
incarceration and the criminal apparatus more generally? Only by
answering this question can we truly appreciate the fundamental tension
between the rise of actuarial risk tools at sentencing and the broader effort
to dismantle the sociohistorical phenomenon of mass incarceration in the
United States. Zeitgeist concerns of technical accuracy cannot answer this
question, but they can distract us from that more holistic perspective on
criminal justice reform. In the process we may succumb to another peril: the
pursuit of technical knowledge may come to define our human values going
forward.
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